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In the oil and gas processing area, adequate risk control must be prearranged to 
prevent incidents, such as major gas leakage, fire, and explosion. Installing gas 
detectors at appropriate technology is one of indispensable conditions for 
implementation of risk reduction measures. The suitability of gas detector 
technology is necessary to ensure the reliability of selected gas detector. This 
research evaluates four alternatives of gas detector based on their characteristic in 
terms of benefit, risks, and cost. Integration of Delphi technique and Fuzzy 
Analytic Hierarchy Process (fuzzy AHP) is implemented to evaluate the 
suitability of gas detector technology. Ten expert panelists from production, 
safety, and maintenance departments are involved in Delphi Technique to assess 
the sub-criteria of fuzzy AHP. The fuzzy AHP evaluation reveals that point-type 
infrared gas detector has the highest value among all gas detector technologies. 
This means that point-type infrared technology has the most efficient value in 
delivering service to process safety operation. Point-type infrared gas detector 
also reveals the best value in risk criteria evaluation. 
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Pada area pemrosesan minyak dan gas bumi, pengendalian risiko yang sesuai 
harus dilakukan untuk mencegah terjadinya suatu insiden, misalnya kebocoran 
gas, kebakaran, dan peledakan. Dengan menginstal detektor gas pada teknologi 
yang sesuai merupakan kondisi yang tidak terelakan untuk mengurangi dampak 
risiko. Jenis detektor gas sesuai merupakan  sebuah keharusan untuk meyakinkan 
reliabilitas dari sistem gas detektor tersebut. Riset ini mengevaluasi empat 
alternatif gas detektor berdasarkan karakteristiknya dalam kriteria benefit, risiko, 
dan biaya. Integrasi teknik Delphi dan Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process (fuzzy 
AHP) digunakan untuk menilai tingkat kepentingan teknologi gas detektor. Sub-
kriteria dibangun dan dinilai berdasarkan teknik Delphi. Sepuluh panelis ahli dari 
bidang ilmu proses, produksi, dan maintenance turut serta dalam menentukan sub-
kriteria tersebut. Evaluasi fuzzy AHP mengungkapkan bahwa detector gas point-
type infrared memiliki nilai tertinggi diantara seluruh gas detector yang lain. Hal 
ini berarti bahwa gas detector point-type infrared memeiliki nilai efisiensi yang 
baik pada operasi keselamatan pemrosesan. Detektor gas jenis point-type infrared 
juga memiliki nilai tebaik pada kriteria risiko.. 
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Oil and gas industry is a form of high risk industry following their 
production of hazardous material. This type of industry mainly deals with 
flammable liquid, explosive gas and toxic substances. This material could be very 
dangerous especially when there is a possibility of ignition source. Fire is major 
hazard in the oil and gas industry. This hazard could lead to a catastrophic event 
which causes total loss of the industry. As the fire mostly comes from ignited 
flammable liquid or explosive gas, therefore there must be a system to limit 
uncontrolled the hydrocarbon release and source of ignition. 
Mitigation measures and further studies should be carried out to overcome 
the risk occurring in daily process operation. This mitigation includes all action in 
order to minimize the consequences of fires and explosions and ease access for 
firefighting when emergency situation happened. Selection right gas detector 
technology to identify preliminary gas detection is key to prevent incident 
escalation.   
The capability of system to detect flammable release events is a key 
component of modern process safety (Legg, 2013). This safety system is then 
called gas detector system. Flammable gas detection relies upon the detection of a 
gas before it reaches its lower explosive limit (LEL). “These limits refer to the gas 
concentrations at which a dispersed gas cloud in air will allow a flame front to 
spread when exposed to an ignition source” (Legg, 2013). 
In addition, proper selection of the sensor specifications is highly 
importance to ensure effective detection of likely gas release. Gas detector 
technology has been developed into four type of sensor: catalytic, point-type 
infrared, open-path infrared, and ultrasonic technology. Each of technology has 
different characteristic and features. Improper technology selection of gas 
detectors may reduce the probability of detecting a particular release, or even 
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yield a sensor completely useless. Therefore, the methodology to select the best 
sensor technology that consider various aspects is needed. 
1.1.1. Oil and Gas Processing Area and Associated Risks 
The oil and gas processing area (OGPA) is petroleum field which process 
oil and gas from hydrocarbon (HC) wells and export crude oil to the oil and gas 
storage and terminal. OGPA product consists of hydrocarbon gas, crude oil and 
hydrocarbon condensate. Presently, facilities in OGPA cover:  
1) More than 115 live hydrocarbon producer wells, produce 2500-barrel oil per 
day (BOPD) and 35 million standard cubic feet per day (MMSCFD) 
2) four water producer wells (dedicated to produce water), 
3) compression platform equipped with 4 interchangeable turbo-compressors, 
4) liquid export platform equipped with 4 interchangeable electric pumps, 
5) gas-lift network for enhance oil recovery, and  
6) automatic fire pumps and fix firefighting means (fire monitor, deluge system, 
and sprinkler). 
The major operating problems encountered in current operation of OGPA 
as follow:  
1) High sand production which cause frequent valves and flow lines leak,  
2) large number of sensitive well; some of them rely on gas lift (loss of gas lift 
may result to potential and reserve loss), and 
3) aging of the installation and obsolescence of equipment and spare part. 
 From the characteristic of OGPA, the major risk occurrence during operation 
relates to the design of the facilities. Those are, (1) Major leak on gathering 
network that could impact accommodation camp and office, (2) major leak on 
OGPA process platform that could impact control room, (3) inadequate fire or gas 
detection on main processing platform, gas compression platform, and liquid 
export platform. The installation of OGPA is displayed on figure 1.1. 
Those above major risks are due to the following reasons: 
1) Major fire or gas leak on OGPA platform, 
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2) safety distances are not well defined in the process area, 
3) emergency shutdown valve (ESDV) within hazardous area, without 
adequate passive fire protection, 
4) numerous flanges and tapping points downstream emergency shutdown 
valves could possibly cause major leak. 
 
 
Figures 1.1 The installation of oil and gas processing area. This OGPA delivers 
production of hydrocarbon oil, gas and condensate.  
 
As faced by the OGPA, those risks should be controlled. Although the 
risks cannot be eliminated completely, yet to ensure optimal safe operability, 
those risk must be minimized. The key of risks control is defined as prevention of 
incident and mitigation of major incident escalation. Failure to perform incident 
escalation can lead the minor incident to be a catastrophic accident. In many 
cases
1
 catastrophic accidents in petroleum/petrochemical processing area begin 
with failure of hydrocarbon containment or inadequate to limit hydrocarbon 
leakage. 
As mainly deal with hydrocarbon release that may lead to major fire 
incident, the OGPA should implement an integrated safety system that could be 
automatically detect the early stage of catastrophic incident such as explosion or 
fire blast. As incident escalation prevention, gas detector should be implemented 
in the process area. 
1
as described in Chapter 2.1. 
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1.1.1.1.  Existing Gas Detector in OGPA 
 The oil and gas processing area has been implemented gas detection 
system by utilizing catalytic technology. This type of gas detector is unlikely to 
detect the real gas release during several incidents occurred in the OGPA (as it 
will be elaborated more in chapter 1.1.1.2). The catalytic gas detector is form of 
gas detection technology which can only detect in the limited coverage area. It can 
only detect in singular point of release and not suitable for windy area. In fact, it is 
the cheapest gas detector available on market. The configuration of catalytic gas 
detector in OGPA is described on figure 1.2. 
 
Figure 1.2a. The location of existing gas detector. It is noted that placement of 





Figure 1.2b. The location of existing gas detector. It is noted that placement of 
gas detector does not cover all hazardous area in the OGPA 
1.1.1.2.  Past Incidents Review in The OGPA  
During its operation, the OGPA has suffered several major or significant 
hydrocarbon release incidents. These incidents are mainly due to ineffective 
detection of existing gas detector. Eventually the process was finally shut downed 
by operator not automatically by system. The incidents are captured hereunder, 
Significant gas leak from body of discharge scrubber compressor 
 July first, 2013 at 14.25, gas leak was found from the body of discharge 
scrubber of Gas Compressor Low Pressure train 2. It is located on second 
deck above compressor unit. Vessel working pressure is 20 barg. 
 The Gas Compressor was then stopped by normal stop at 15.30 for 
intervention. 
 No gas detector was active as the 2nd deck of compressor is beyond 




Gas cloud from rupture 6” flange fuel gas inlet compressor  
 November, 11st 2009 at 13.10 a high noisy sound is heard from office and 
control room, site operator checked on location and found gas cloud from 
rupture 6” flange fuel gas inlet 1 compressor. The operator was noticed 
before ESD. 
 At 13.15 Processing platform got ESD (shut down and depressurize) 
initiated 
Based on the situation faced by the OGPA, it is confirmed that the existing 
catalytic gas detector is not optimal for detecting hydrocarbon release. The 
existing catalytic gas detector must be re-evaluated by analyzing their benefit, cost 
and risk. They are even probably changed with newer technology such as, infrared 
or ultrasonic leak detector.  
1.1.2. Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process in Multi Criteria Decision Making 
The selection of sensor technology based on various criteria can be 
regarded as a Multi criteria decision making (MCDM) problem. MCDM is 
methodology for modelling process of complex engineering problem (Kahraman, 
2008). Multi criteria decision making based on the characteristic to evaluate 
complex criteria and numerous alternatives. The final goal of MCDM is to 
achieve the best alternatives based on given multi criteria. Two types of MCDM 
methods are the analytical hierarchy process (AHP) and analytical network 
process (ANP). Both mentioned methodology is performed by quantifying output 
values based on pairwise comparison matrix. The different is that AHP the criteria 
involved do not have correlation one to another. Whereas in ANP all the criteria 
involved are correlated to the others. Specifically, in this research, criteria 
involved is not correlated each other. Therefore, AHP based methodology is 
chosen. 
In the conventional AHP, methodology to perform multi criteria decision 
making is based on single crisp number (Chen, 1996). This methodology has been 
criticized for handling uncertainty in the decision maker’s judgement to a number 
(Ayag & Ozdemir, 2006). The conventional AHP is unable to precisely process 
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uncertainty and vagueness in performing pair-wise comparisons (Gupta et al., 
2005). In addition, the factors for assessing suitability level of gas detector 
technology is often observed as qualitative criteria. The vagueness and uncertainty 
is difficult to put exact crisp number to represent the judgment, such as 
“environment distractive signal”. In order to overcome this limitation, fuzzy 
analytic hierarchy process was introduced (Laarhoven & Pedrycz, 1983). 
Developed based on fuzzy logic and method of MCDM, Fuzzy AHP is capable of 
evaluating uncertainty in human thought and preference. This method will enable 
AHP to adapt in the evaluation where the criteria and alternatives, are based on 
qualitative judgement or imprecise (Li, 2005). 
Based on the advantages delivered by fuzzy AHP, this research employs 
this methodology to evaluate selection of gas detector technology. Expected result 
of fuzzy AHP is that this methodology can deliver precise result on the evaluation. 
The result of fuzzy AHP evaluation shall be scientifically true based on this 
research conclusion. 
1.2. Problem Statement 
 Based on the intrinsic characteristic of high risk industry, oil and gas 
processing area (OGPA) covers several problems that need to be reinstated, those 
are: 
1. The capability and suitability of gas detectors technology should be 
quantified to best applied in the oil and gas processing area.  
2. The gas detector criteria are analyzed based on their benefit, cost, and risk 
associated. Fuzzy analytic hierarchy process is implemented for evaluation 
the selection. And the sub-criteria are developed and ranked based on Delphi 
technique. 
3. Criteria defined from selection of gas detection technology shall taking into 
account the level of risk into the ALARP (as low as reasonable and 
practicable). The term of reasonable is based on capital and operational cost, 
and practicable is for delivering normal production. As the gas detection 
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technology is linked with safety shutdown system, the detection must be 
accurate to prevent spurious shutdown which caused by false detection. 
1.3. Research Objectives 
The formulated purpose of this research is defined as follow: 
1. To define selection sub-criteria and alternatives attribute for the optimal 
operation in terms of ALARP for oil and gas processing area in selecting the 
gas detector technology. 
2. To obtain best applicable in terms of ALARP for selecting the gas detector 
technology in Oil and Gas Processing Area. The selection shall take into 
account benefit, cost and risk analysis for the decision making. This research 
covers an internal factor such as: Control System Mechanism, major risk that 
is faced by OGPA, and practicability for production deliverability.  
3. To evaluate the result category based on Fuzzy-analytic hierarchy process in 
selecting gas detector technology. 
1.4. Research Scope 
 In order to make robust problem solving, the subject limitation for this 
research is defined as follow, 
1. Implementation of this research is based on petroleum processing plant 
operated in east Kalimantan region. This plant has been delivering oil and gas 
production for more than 40 years with average production of 2500-barrel oil 
per day (BOPD) and 35 million standard cubic feet per day (MMSCFD) 
2. The selection of gas detector technology sub-criteria is based on interview 
and questioner involving 10 expertise or engineer working in the oil and gas 
processing area. Those are: Production Method service engineer, 
Maintenance department engineer, head of project interface department, and 
head of safety concept service. The sub-criteria development is based on two-
round Delphi technique. 
3. Evaluation of gas detector methodology is based on fuzzy analytic hierarchy 
process and conventional analytic hierarchy process. 
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4. Typical gas detectors evaluated are: catalytic gas detector, ultrasonic gas leak 
detector, open-path infrared gas detector and point-type infrared gas detector. 
5. This research analyzes gas detector technology based on benefit delivered by 
gas detector characteristic, capital and operational costs, and its capability to 
reduce risk into ALARP condition. 
1.5. Expected Benefits 
 The analysis for evaluating gas detector category mainly provides several 
advantages as described below: 
1. This research helps the company to understand the critical factors for 
determining gas detector technology capability and characteristic in detecting 
flammable gas.  
2. Describe the importance of selecting suitable gas detector technology for 
early detection effectiveness and efficiency.  
3. Result of this research would help the company management to select which 
gas detector technology is best applied in oil and gas processing area. 
Managerial implication for gas detector selection shall be based on this 
research. Management of Petroleum Company shall use this research as one 
of guidance for implementing future development of gas detector in the 
OGPA. 
4. Obtaining the optimal safety and production deliverability within oil and gas 
processing area which can be implemented in all other affiliate or sites.  
1.6. Structure of the Thesis 
The structure of this thesis is defined into several chapters and sub-
chapters as follow: 
CHAPTER I  INTROCUTION 
This chapter consists of research background in regards to 
importance of selecting suitable gas detector technology, 
problems reinstatement, research objectives, research 
advantages, research limitation, and structure of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER II LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter consists of several literature review for 
developing the thesis. The main literature in this research 
involves studies related to risk definition in oil and gas 
processing area: control system mechanism, fire zone 
principle, and hazardous area classification. Besides that, 
this chapter explains detail characteristic and working 
methodology of gas detector technology. In addition, 
principle of multi criteria decision making is described 
based on conventional analytic hierarchy process, triangular 
fuzzy number, and fuzzy analytic hierarchy process. 
CHAPTER III RESEARCH METHODS 
This chapter defines the methodology used in this research 
to analyze the selection of gas detector technology. The 
methodology covers working flowchart in developing 
Delphi technique, data collection based on interview and 
questionnaire for assessing the sub-criteria. In addition, this 
chapter describes general flowchart used in this research for 
determining body of research project and fuzzy analytic 
hierarchy design based on criteria selected. 
CHAPTER IV RESULT OF DELPHI TECHNIQUE AND 
EVALUATION OF FUZZY AHP  
 From data and analytic hierarchy structure which is 
obtained from previous chapter, it is implemented an 
evaluation of fuzzy AHP as follow: 
A. Evaluation of fuzzy AHP for benefit category 
B. Evaluation of fuzzy AHP for costs category 
C. Evaluation of fuzzy AHP for risks category 
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The analysis for above categories is calculated based fuzzy 
pairwise comparison matrix. To develop a fuzzy judgement 
matrix based on triangular fuzzy number which one of sub-
criteria is more important to another. 
CHAPTER V RESEARCH RESULT AND ANALYSIS 
 In this chapter explain results of the final value of fuzzy 
AHP methodology for alternatives are obtained for each 
level of categories, criteria, and alternatives. Quantified 
score for each gas detector technology is listed precisely. 
CHAPTER VI CONCLUSION AND RESEARCH SUGGESTION 
 In this chapter of thesis, it is explained overall conclusion 
based on analysis of research in selection of gas detector 
technology. This chapter also suggests the OGPA 
management in implementation of suitable gas detector 
based on methodology selected in this research. This 
conclusion of research is expected to provide obvious 
















2.1.  Risk Related to Oil and Gas Processing Area 
Within oil and gas processing area, fire is the main hazard which can lead 
to total disastrous event. Respecting to magnitude of consequence, incidents are 
classed into several rank, those are: Insignificant, Minor, Moderate, Major, and 
Catastrophic (Basu, 2017). All of those categories have consequences in 
respective layer: human, environment, asset, production shortfall, and company 
reputation. The catastrophic incident possible to occur in oil and gas process gas 
area is described hereunder. 
2.1.1. Un-ignited gas/spray cloud 
The gas cloud is formed by high pressurized system which has loss of 
containment of hydrocarbon. Gas cloud may be formed as spray-mist of 
condensate vapor or natural methane gas. The early stage of catastrophic incident 
escalation begins as gas cloud incident often in many cases. As described in 
Chevron Richmond refinery incident, the gas cloud which cannot be limited either 
by time or quantity is the root cause of the catastrophic incident. At this stage 
early gas detection is the key of incident prevention. Without existence human in 
the process, adequate gas detection system is able to detect and delimitate amount 
of gas leakage. 
2.1.2. Flash Fire 
“A flash fire is the non-explosive combustion of a vapor cloud resulting 
from a release of flammable material into the open air, which, after mixing with 
air, ignites” (CCPS, 1994). The flash fires occur when flammable gas is released 
in windy condition ignited by fire or heat. The concentration of gas is enough only 
to be ignited but not to create explosion. The flash fire is not likely to produce 
detonation; only slow deflagration is often observed. 
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2.1.3. Boil Over  
As defined by NFPA, boil over is “an event in the burning of certain oils 
in an open-top tank when, after a long period of quiescent burning, there is a 
sudden increase in fire intensity associated with expulsion of burning oil from the 
tank” (NFPA, 2013). This incident occurs when there is an explosion caused by 
expansion of water at the bottom at tank and rapidly force out burnt liquid 
hydrocarbon causing massive explosion. This typical incident has occurred 
several times, including incident in RU V Cilacap-Indonesia, Caribbean 
Petroleum Tank (chemical safety board, 2010), and Milford Haven boil over incident 
(Persson & Lonnermark, 2014). Simulation of boil over is described in figure 2.1. 
  
Figure 2.1. Simulation of boil over is performed in small scale. one kilogram 




2.1.4.  BLEVE 
Another form of expansion liquid explosion is named BLEVE. The 
BLEVE is standing for boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion. The 
characteristic of this incident involves in closed pressurized vessel rather than 
open type tank which occur in boil over incidents. A BLEVE has been defined as 
“an explosion resulting from the failure of a vessel containing a liquid at a 
temperature significantly above its boiling point at normal atmospheric pressure” 
(CCPS, 1994). In terms of detonation, BLEVE is often gives shockwave as energy 
released by the explosion. In many case BLEVE is likely to be occurred in 
pressurized vessel (three phase separator), liquefied petroleum spherical vessel, or 
hydrocarbon boiler/distillation column.  
 
Figure 2.2. Example of BLEVE during San Juanico disaster, 1984.  source 
picture: alchetron.com 
2.1.5.  Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE) 
The vapor cloud explosion is defined “as explosion resulting from the 
ignition of a cloud of flammable vapor, gas, or mist in which flame speeds 
accelerate to sufficiently high velocities to produce significant overpressure” 
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(CCPS,1994). Vapor cloud explosion is formed based on the release of 
hydrocarbon gas vaporizing from liquid or gas from pressurized vessel or tank.  
The release of hydrocarbon shall be sufficient so that it can be ignited by fire or 
heat. Flammable gas in high density is more likely to be hazardous in terms of 
VCE occurrence. This fact is due to high density vapor is heavier than air, and it 
will be accumulated and hard to disperse. For instance, propane and butane gas 
are likely to be easier to ignite rather than methane. As described by CCPS, vapor 
cloud explosion incident occurred in Port Hudson, Missouri, “On December 9, 
1970, a liquefied propane pipeline ruptured near Port Hudson. About 24 minutes 
later, the resulting vapor cloud was ignited. The pressure effects were very severe. 
The blast was equivalent to that of 50,000 kg of detonating TNT.” (CCPS, 1994). 
 
Figure 2.3. Port Hudson, Missouri disaster, this incident is resulted by vapor 
cloud   explosion (CCPS, 1994).  Source picture: CCPS Guidelines 
for Evaluating the Characteristics of Vapor Cloud Explosions, 
Flash Fires, and BLEVEs page 96  
17 
 
2.3.  Safety Instrumented System 
 According to IEC 61511 (2003), safety instrumented system (SIS) is 
“instrumented system used to implement one or more safety instrumented 
functions (SIF). An SIS is composed of any combination of sensor(s), logic 
solvers, and final element(s)” (IEC 61511:2003). In process safety engineering, 
mainly safety instrumentation system is divided by: 
1. Pressure protection system such as HIPPS (High-integrity pressure 
protection system) or pressure relieve/safety valve (PSV). This system is 
designed to prevent over-pressurization of plant, such as processing plant or 
oil refinery (API STD 521, 2014). Although the main function of HIPPS 
and PSV is quite similar, their working principle is different. PSV is 
preventing from overpressure by limiting process working pressure. This 
based on mechanical protection valve which will be opened and vented in 
safe place when there is overpressure. The HIPPS will shut off the source of 
the high pressure before the design pressure of the system is exceeded, thus 
preventing loss of containment through rupture (explosion) of a line or 
vessel (Wikipedia, 2017). 
2. Emergency shutdown system (ESD). This system is mainly functioned to 
reduce the potential of escalation from unwanted event. Basically this 
mechanism based on limitation of hydrocarbon containment (ESDV), 
Eliminate source of ignition (Electrical shutdown), and reduce flammable 
inventory (emergency depressurization) (API STD 521, 2014).  
3. Fire and gas system (F&G).as it has been named, this system is divided into 
fire system and gas detection system. The fire system functioned as early 
detection of heat source for ignition. This system is designed to prevent 
existence of fire-flame or heat source for a flammable gas to be ignited.  The 
gas detection system is designed to prevent escalation of undesired event by 
detecting source of hazardous gas before it reached to the lower explosive 
level concentration (LEL). Both of fire and gas system is connected to 
emergency shutdown system. 
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4. Ultimate safety system (USS). This system is mainly functioned as back-up 
for essential emergency shutdown system (ESD) action. The ultimate safety 
system is designed based on solid state logic solver handling main function 
of safety shutdown system. 
 
Figure 2.4. Safety critical element hierarchy. As part of safety critical element,  
gas detection system is included in the Control layer which avoid 
accidental ignition of release. Based on the safety critical element 
principle, Gas detection mentioned in this research are compatible 
with the existing process design. 
As primarily designed to enhance safe condition in oil and gas processing 
area, the safety instrumented system, as shown in figure 2.4. is mandatory to be 
existed. However, the installation of safety instrumented system does not 
completely eliminate hazard. The controlling mechanism is more likely to reduce 
probability and/or severity of risks to ALARP condition. 
2.3. Control System Mechanism 
The OGPA control system mechanism is based on distributed control 
system and human-machine interface located in control room which is 
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permanently manned and monitored by panel operator. The control system is 
designed to monitor and operate automatically and continuously the different 
modules on the oil process in several platforms (gas compression, liquid export, 
oil-water treatment unit, and liquid treatment process). The system controls 
automatically these facilities start-up, normal running, downgraded modes of 
operation, turndown, normal shutdown and emergency shutdown.  
In principle, the OGPA control system is divided into several 
interconnected and redundant programmable logic controllers. In the first layer of 
control system is the Process Control System (PCS). This mechanism controls 
normal operation of process facilities. The controls include opening and closing 
process control valve, liquid-gas control level, and normal temperature control. 
The second layer of control system is Process Safety System (PSS) which 
working in separated core with PCS. PSS will initiate shutdown to equipment 
which called SD-3 (shutdown level-3). This mechanism is triggered by deviation 
outside operating limit process unit, such as level switch very-low, pressure 
switch very high, and temperature switch very high. 
 
Figure 2.5. Control system diagram block. It defines hierarchical structure of 
safety shutdown system. Each of block diagram is defined as 
individual distributed control system. 
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The third layer of control system is called Emergency Shutdown (ESD) 
System. This mechanism control whole operation of shutdown system, including 
shutting down emergency shutdown valve, opening blow down valve (for 
depressurization), and triggering all process shutdown system. The fourth layer of 
control system is Fire and Gas (F&G) system. The Fire and Gas system is 
detected from gas detector, fire/flame detector, and smoke detector. It initiates fire 
extinguishing system, deluge system, and triggers Emergency Shutdown System.  
The last layer is ultimate layer called Safety Shutdown System. This system 
controls the shut downing mechanism of all power (high voltage and low voltage), 
including uninterruptable power supply for control room after triggering ESD 
system and F&G System. The safety shutdown system also called ESD-0 
(emergency shutdown system level-0). It can be activated only by push button for 
processing area abandonment.  The overall hierarchy of control system is 
described on figure 2.5. 
2.3. The Fire Zone Principle 
Fire zone is process area where equipments are located in similar level of 
risks. One fire zone to another should be separated by sufficient distance or barrier 
so that in one fire occurrence is not affecting the other fire zone. “The partition of 
an installation into fire zones results in a significant reduction of the level of risk. 
This implies that consequences of a fire, flammable gas leak or an explosion 
corresponding to the credible event likely to occur in the concerned fire zone, 
shall not impact other fire zones to an extent where their integrity could be put at 




Figure 2.6.  The configuration of fire zone in typical oil and gas processing 
area. The fire zones are located inside restricted area. 
In OGPA, the considered fire zone has not been identified properly due to 
unavailability of safety concept. The only configuration of for determining fire 
zones in OGPA comes from ESD logic. In OGPA can be divided in 5 different 
fire zones: 
1) A. Main OGPA processing platform (consist of separation vessel and 
settling tank) 
B. Liquid export platform (consist of 4 interchangeable export pump) 
2) Gas lift compression platform (consist of 4 turbo generator compression) 
3) Enhance oil recovery platform (gas compression platform with 2 electric 
compressor) 
4) Oily water treatment unit (OWT) 
5) Power platform (consist of 5 interchangeable turbine engine generator) 




Figure 2.7. The layout of oil and gas processing area associated with its fire 
zone represented with different color. 
2.4. Hazardous Area Classification 
The hazardous area is defined according to its potentiality in generating 
concentration of flammable gases or vapor. In petroleum and petrochemical 
processing plant, potential concentration of flammable vapors is commonly 
occurred permanently. Flammable gas concentration is defined as lower explosive 
limit (LEL) and Upper explosive limit (UEL). The LEL is concentration of gas or 
vapor mixed with air (percentage by volume, at room temperature) that will cause 
the propagation of flames when it comes in contact with a source of ignition. 
While the UEL is the maximum concentration of gas or vapor mixed with air 
(percent by volume, at room temperature) that will cause the propagation of 
flames when it comes in contact with an ignition source (Kumar et al., 2013). 
The risk of ignition source must be limited within hazardous area. As 
defined by recommendation practice for classification at petroleum facilities (API 
recommended practice 505, 1997) hazardous area classification are:  
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1) “Zone 0, a location in which ignitable concentration of flammable gases or 
vapors are present continuously or present for long period of time (more than 
1000 hours per year);  
2) Zone 1, a location in which ignitable concentration of flammable gases or 
vapors are likely to exist under normal operating condition or may exist 
frequently because of maintenance operations or because of leakage (10< 
hours/ year < 1000);  
3) Zone 2, a location in which ignitable concentration of flammable gases or 
vapors are not likely to occur in normal operation and if they do occur will 
exist only for a short period (1< hour/ year< 10). The zone 2 usually includes 
location that would become hazardous only in case of an accident or of some 
unusual condition;  
4) Unclassified zone, a location where considered as safe area and ignitable 
concentration of flammable gases and vapors is not considerable (less than 1 
hour/year).” 
Gas detector installation should take into account the hazardous area 
range. Zone 1 and Zone 2 are the most undertaken location for placement. 
Placement of gas detector for Zone 0 is not required because flammable gases or 
vapors has been expected continuously. Risk control for Zone 0 is mainly by 
limitation of containment. Nonetheless, gas detector placement for unclassified 
zone is never been a consideration since flammable gases and vapors is not 
expected. Risk control for unclassified zone is by installation of smoke and fire 
detector. 
2.5. Gas Detector Technology   
There are several types of detectors are commonly used for the detection 
of flammable gas clouds. Current technologies are catalytic, infrared sensors, and 
ultrasonic gas leak detector. Catalytic gas sensors detect the presence of a 
chemical contaminant by an oxidation-reduction reaction with the catalyst. 
Infrared sensors work by detecting the amount of infrared energy absorbed by a 
contaminant cloud at specific wavelengths. The infrared sensors possess a higher 
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unit cost but can often detect contaminant with more accurate gas monitoring. 
Ultrasonic gas leak detector sense the noise change which generated by a gas leak 
comprises both audible and ultrasonic frequencies. The sensors are able to identify 
ultrasonic sound frequencies (25kHz to 100kHz), while excluding audible 
frequencies (0 to 25kHz) (Sizeland, 2014). This methodology delivers wider 
coverage of detection than catalytic gas detector and infrared gas detector. 
However, its characteristic of sensitivity could lead to spurious detection and it is 
not suitable for noisy environment, such as near compressor or high pressure-high 
flow well. 
2.5.1. Catalytic Gas Detector 
The principle of catalytic gas detector is based on catalytic combustion 
within an element on principle of Wheatstone bridge. Platinum coil embedded in a 
catalyst is the main element of censor known as catalytic beads sensor. The 
flammable gas measured is entered into a chamber and react with catalytic 
reaction and produced heat. As the heat produced is increase by the concentration 
of flammable gas, this cause a change of resistance within the embedded coil that 
is measured and monitored. The catalytic beads sensor consists of two identical 
beads, one as baseline reference and the other as active measuring element which 
oxidized flammable gas present. Baseline reference bead is then compared to the 
resistance of the active bead to determine the concentration of gas measured. In 
principle of Wheatsone bridge, comparison resistance between active beads and 
baseline reference bead results in a measurable voltage differential which 
correspond to the concentration of flammable gas. 
Catalytic combustion reaction on the surface of active bead involving 
flammable gas and oxygen is given as: 




Figure 2.8. Installation of Catalytic gas detector. Based on its characteristic, 
this gas detector shall be placed in redundant configuration in one 
coverage area 
From above reaction, one parts of methane required two parts of oxygen, which 
mean at concentration of 20% oxygen in the air, it requires ten parts of air 
existence. For a sensor to detect methane, the signal output will respond linearly 
from 0–5% of methane. As the concentration reaches close to 9%, the signal 
increases very rapidly and peaks at around 10% (Kumar et al., 2013). Based on 
this characteristic, catalytic gas detector can only be used in oxygen sufficient 
environment and not suitable for detecting methane (flammable gas) above 10% 
concentration. This phenomenon is called sensor poisoning. In general, Sensors 
based on catalytic oxidation shall not be used in low oxygen atmospheres, in high 
air flow-rates, or in high gas concentrations. 
2.5.2. Infrared Gas Detector 
The developed gas detection technology is based on infrared absorption in 
specific wavelength when the radiation is passing through in concentration of 
flammable gas. The mechanism of detection is based on infrared transmitter and 
sensor measuring light intensity. Two infrared wavelength transmitters, one as 
active measuring flammable gas wavelength, and the other as reference 
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wavelength. As the flammable gas release at the detector, it will be passed 
through infrared transmitter and sensor. The infrared intensity will be reduced at 
the active wavelength, while the infrared intensity remains steady. The difference 
infrared intensity is converted into electronics signal and displayed as flammable 
gas concentration. Figure 2.9. describe the infrared spectrum absorbed by the 
concentration of flammable gas. 
 
Figure 2.9. Methane absorption infrared spectrum, it has main absorption 
peaks at 3.37 – 3.51µm (Naranjo & Baligha, 2012).   
2.5.2.1. Point-type Infrared Detector 
Point-type infrared gas detector configures installation of infrared 
transmitter and sensor in fixed path length that last in a few inches. The gas 
concentration is considered as uniform disperse across this length. Point-type 
infrared gas detector is useful to detect flammable gas in the specific placement 
with accurate measurement. The coverage area of point-type infrared gas detector 
is typically narrow. Therefore, implementation this model of gas detector is best 
placed on specific gas release location and for highly accurate detection, such as 
gas turbine enclosure, gas compressor package, and engine air intake. 
2.5.2.2. Open-Path Infrared Gas Detector 
Open-path infrared gas detectors typically consist of a radiation transmitter 
and a physically separate, remote sensor/receiver. The detector measures the 
average concentration of gas along the path of the beam. Open-path infrared gas 
detector offers capability to cover wide open area or a process area where there is 
27 
 
a line of potential hydrocarbon release, such as a row of pressurized vessel or 
turbine compressor.  
 
Figure 2.10. Installation of open-path infrared gas detector. It involves receiver 
and transmitter which detect gas concentration along the beam  
The unit of measurement is the concentration multiplied by path length, % 
LEL x m and ppm x m. The length of open-path distances is typically 25m for 
offshore and up to 50 m for onshore installation. The minimum alarm level is set 
at 0.5 LEL x 1m (50% LEL extended for one meter). It also gives an alarm if 
there is a flammable gas cloud of 5% LEL over a distance of 10 m. The detail 





Figure 2.11. Open-path infrared gas detector LEL and length of beam 
calculation. Gas detector 1 measures 10% LEL x 10m = 100% LEL 
at leak source 1 and gas detector 2 measures 50%LEL x 3m = 
150% LEL at leak source 2.  
2.5.3. Ultrasonic Gas Detector 
Unlike neither the catalytic nor the infrared detection system, ultrasonic 
gas leak detector responds to the gas leak source rather than measuring 
concentration of gas released. Ultrasonic gas leak detector sense the presence of 
gas leak by detecting sound produced by leak source as gas come out from the 
containment. The sound is produced as gas travels from a high-pressure situation 
to a low-pressure environment (Sizeland, 2014). Characteristic from the sound 
generated is ultrasonic sound, type of sound that the frequency above audible to 
human hearing. Instead of measuring gas concentration, gas leak quantification is 
based on leak rate measurement or commonly known as mass flowrate of the 
jetting gas. 
As defined by Naranjo and Baligha (2009), the scale of measurement is 
defined as Sound Pressure Level (SPL). “The scale is based on logarithmic scale 
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defined as decibel (dB)”. Since the sound power is directly proportional to the 
power generated by the gas upon expansion (Naranjo & Baligha, 2009), SPL can 
be expressed as: 
          
   
 
                                                               
Where m is the mass flow rate of the jetting gas, T is gas temperature at the 
leaking orifice, M is the molecular weight, and R is the gas constant. The mass 
flowrate (kg/s) is defined as equation 3: 
         
  
 
    
  
    
        
 
   
 
   
   
                                                  
Where,  
ϒ = Isentropic expansion factor (Cp / Cv) 
m = Mass flow rate, Kg/s 
Cd = Discharge coefficient (between 0.8 and 1 for gases) 
A = Hole area in m2 
Mw = Molecular weight, Kg/mol 
Tg = Temperature of the vessel in K 
Pg = Absolute pressure of the gas in Pa 
P = Ambient pressure in Pa 
Based on the methodology of leak detection, ultrasonic gas leak detector is 
not defining the type of gas released. Methane, propane, or natural gas containing 
H2S is commonly detected as alarm triggering. At some case, ultrasonic gas 
detector seldom detects normal gas relieving process (e.g. pressure relief valve,) 
or air-actuated instrument venting. This could cause some drawbacks from the 
detection system, as spurious gas detection may cause unwanted shutdown that 
may lead to production shortfall.  
Besides some drawbacks from its detection methodology, ultrasonic gas 
leak detector provides several advantages that distinctively other type of gas 
30 
 
detector cannot. Wide spread area coverage and provides early detection system 
are the main benefit by using ultrasonic technology. Low maintenance cost, less 
need of calibration and long lasting sensor lifespan are also main benefits of this 
technology. 
2.6. Delphi Technique 
 Delphi Technique is defined as methodology for obtaining decision based 
on expert judgement it is commonly formed in panelist, participants, or 
respondents (Dalkey & Helmer, 1963). The participant of experts is become 
important to perform scientific judgements. It is supposed that probability of 
wrong decision is more unlikely to be made by involving several experts (Hasson 
et.al, 2000). Features of Delphi consist of anonymity, iteration and controlled 
feedback from prior round to the current one, statistical aggregation of group 
responses, and expert panels (Zangenehmadar & Mosselhi, 2016). In short, Delphi 
Technique is a method of “allowing a group of individuals, as whole to deal with 
complex problem while avoiding their direct confrontation and retaining their 
interactions” (Linstone & Turoff, 1975).  
 In the process of research development, Delphi Technique is used for 
determining sub-criteria and attributes in selecting most suitable gas detector 
technology. Weighting in form of “Rank-type” (Zangenehmadar & Mosselhi, 
2016) is used for determining important factor that applicable in selecting gas 
detector technology. These factors should cover advantages, costs, and risk 
aspects. At first, Delphi Technique process begin with problem statement and 
description of research objectives. Then, experts and panelist are selected based 
on their competencies in relevant studies and working métier. As defined by 
Trevelyan and Robinson (2015) to develop Delphi Technique there are several 
areas to consider as follow, 
Selecting expert panelist: 
 To consider competencies and relevant studies for the panel. Avoid labelling 
experts without consideration of this label  
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 Understand that result of Delphi might not reach in synonymous decision in 
term of consensus. 
Iteration 
 To consider number of iteration, “Three number are optimal” 
 Consider the panelist to rank the importance of each choice or criteria post 
completion of Delphi study 
First round: 
 Floor to the panelist the well-structured open-ended question, or develop 
initial statement that might be agreed or disagreed by panelist 
 Beware of trivial statement that may lead to large amount of subsequent data 
Second round: 
 Develop weighting in criteria based on Likert scale. “The optimum number of 
response lie between four to seven” 
 In case panelist is not fully understanding the problems, their results might be 
omitted. “Consider providing No Comment Option” 
 “Consider the potential pitfalls of using a Likert scale with a midpoint” 
Subsequent round: 
 Perform question recirculation from round two and delivering its feedback 
 Avoid omitting data as it will create bias and prevent full analysis results 
Participant feedback: 
 Consider to deliver “visual feedback” (graphical information) to describe the 
distribution of data 




 Define the level of consensus. The terms of consensus are not similar with 
synonymous decisions. Clear level of consensus agreement is the stooping 
guideline of Delphi Technique 
 “Differentiate between stability (consistency), agreement, and consensus” 
 Measurement of data distribution as variance is “appropriate for determining 
consensus” 
Stability of response/ consistency: 
 “Stability of response should not be confused with consensus” 
 “If analyzed, the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank test is appropriate 
methods to inferentially determine stability of response. Stability could also 
be determined though providing data on the median and IQR across rounds or 
through graphical representation” 
As described by Black et al. (1999) “There is no empirical relationship 
between the number experts and the validity of the survey and some researchers 
believed that the numbers of experts is subjected to the available resources and 
scope of the problems.” In most of research 15-35 experts panel are involved 
(Zangenehmadar & Mosselhi, 2016). Specifically, in this research, ten expert 
panelist who have background in chemical-process safety engineering are 
involved. 
2.7. Analytic Hierarchy Process 
 Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) methodology has been used in recent 
decades to determine weighting factors in multi-criterion decision making. “The 
Analytic Hierarchy modeling and measurement process (AHP) is a scientific 
approach used to determine the relative importance of a set of activities or 
criteria” (Saaty et al., 2015). This methodology was developed by Saaty (1977), 
Analytical Hierarchy Process demonstrates consistent result in determining both 
qualitative and quantitative factors. It reduces complex decision to a series of one-
to-one comparisons then synthesizes the results. AHP uses the expertise ability to 








Figure 2.12.  Three level of hierarchy in AHP selection methodology  
The pair wise comparison is valid for reciprocal condition. It means that 
comparison for alternative (a) over alternative (b) is equal with 1/ (alternative (b) 
over alternative (a)). The equation can be written as, 
           
 
          
     
 
   
                                         
Where Pc(Ai,Aj) is preference value of alternative Ai over alternative Aj. 
Therefore, for n number of alternatives, the equation can be explained by matrix, 
A = (aij)n x n structure, 





        
 
   
     










                                                 
“This means that, if the entries exactly represent ratios between weights, then the 
matrix A can be expressed in the following form” (Brunelli, 2015), 
    
                
                
    
                
                                         
In developing pair wise comparison, consistency is the key value to show the 
reliability of AHP structure. The consistency value (CI) is a way to measure 
degree of error in judgment criteria. CI is calculated as follow:  
Selection of Goal 
Criteria 1  Criteria 2  Criteria 3  Criteria n 
... 




    
       
   
                                                          
Where      is the maximum Eigen value of matrix A and n is the order.  
The Consistency index (CI), then divided by Random Index (RI) to determine 
Consistency Ratio (CR). 
    
  
  
                                                                 
Where RI is the appropriate random index from following N number of criteria. 
N  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
RI 0 0 0,58 0,90 1,12 1,24 1,32 1,41 1,45 1,49 
Table 2.1 Values of Random Index (RI) 
Consistence and reliable AHP structure should not exceed values of CR= 0.1. 
 
2.8. Fuzzy Logic  
 “The theory of fuzzy logic provides a mathematical strength to capture the 
uncertainties associated with human cognitive processes, such as thinking and 
reasoning” (Kahraman, 2008). Fuzzy logic as a form of “truth-valued” logic 
ranged between 0 and 1. The applicability of fuzzy logic is often to describe 
application of probabilistic value related to human thinking. For instance, in terms 
of temperature, human thinking might describe it as Cold, Cold to warm, Warm, 
Warm to hot, and Hot. This description of this level can be described as figure 





Figure 2.13. Fuzzy logic graphical explanation for temperature condition. 
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2.9. Triangular Fuzzy Number (TFN) 
The fuzzy set theory was first introduced by Zadeh (1965) to compensate 
human relative thought or vagueness. The membership function in fuzzy set 
theory within universal set R is defined as follow 
                                                                               
Where,      is degree of membership of x, which represent universal set R 
to the interval within [0,1] Membership function of fuzzy set is described as 











A fuzzy number on universal set R to be a TFN is denoted as              with 
the membership function is equal to (Kaufmann, 1991 within Kusumadewi, et.al, 
2006) 






                                                                                           
     
      
                                                               
    
      
                                                           
                                                                                               
  
 
Concerning the interval of confidence, showing the coefficient α, the triangular 
fuzzy number has a characteristic as (Kaufmann, 1991 within Kusumadewi, et al., 
2006) 
         
        
   




       
     
                                                        
The mathematical operations of triangular fuzzy number include (Soheil & 
Kaveh, 2010): 
Addition,  
                                                                 
Subtraction,  
                                                                 
Multiplication, 
                                                                      
Division, 
                                                                        
And reciprocal,  
                   






   
 
 
                                              
2.10. Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process 
Fuzzy analytic Hierarchy process is the further development from analytic 
hierarchy process (AHP) to compensate the deficiency of vagueness in multi 
criteria decision making (MCDM) (Kahraman, et al., 2004). Since AHP figures 
incapability to overcome uncertainty and imprecision of computation, Laarhoven 
and Pedrycz was first developed the fuzzy analytic hierarchy process (Kahraman, 
2008). This methodology involves triangular fuzzy number as triplet number 
(Chang, 1996) for computation in pairwise comparison, same as those crisp in 
AHP. In fuzzy AHP, result of computation is described in interval of values which 
can be evaluated according to level of confidence (index of optimism) 
(Kusumadewi, et al., 2006). 
To perform computation in fuzzy AHP, procedures is described as follow: 
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Step1: Modify Saaty scale into triangular fuzzy number, including the linguistic 
preference scale 
 







Table 2.2.  The membership function of Saaty scale  
Fuzzy number (Saaty scale) Linguistic preference scale Membership function 
1 Equally important (1,1,3) 
3 Weakly important (1,3,5) 
5 Essentially  important (3,5,7) 
7 Very strong important (5,7,9) 
9 Absolutely important (7,9,9) 
The fuzzy membership function is listed as lower and upper value (al , am) with 
equation 17: 
      
                          
      




    
 
 
    
   
      




    
 
 
    
  
      




    
 
 
    
  
      







    
                 
















Step 2: Perform computation based on fuzzy pairwise comparison matrix. Develop 
a fuzzy judgement matrix A  based on triangular fuzzy number (al, am, au) 
which one of criteria is more important to another. 





            
            
    










            
     
         
    
     
       





                     
Where, 
     
   
                                                                              
                                                                            
                                                                                     
  
Step 3: Calculating fuzzy weight by applying geometric mean for each criterion. 
As stated by Wang and Chen (Wang and Chen,2008), the fuzzy weight of 
each criterion are calculated by Buckley (1985) as follows: 
                           
   
                                                
And determine weight of fuzzy value by normalizing each criterion 
   
  
          
                                                           
Where,       is the fuzzy pairwise comparison value i compare to j    is the 
geometric mean, and   is  the fuzzy weight value of the ith criterion. 
Step 4: Determining fuzzy final value by calculating hierarchical layer sequencing 
(Wang and Chen, 2008). 
       
 
   
                                                                  
Where,     is the fuzzy weight value of the jth criterion to the ith alternatives. The 
value of      is representing by triangular fuzzy number                  . 
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Step 5: Determining rank for each alternative by implementing defuzzyfication of 
triangular fuzzy number             . 
It is necessary to define a method for building a crisp value from the fuzzy 
number to choose the optimum alternative. Therefore, a defuzzification 
process needs to be adopted, which arranges the fuzzy numbers for ranking 
(Wang and Chen, 2008). The defuzzification of              is based on 
total integral value (Kusumadewi, et al., 2006). 
 
   
 
 
                                                                      
Where, α is the degree of optimism, which can be chosen by decision maker, 
valued from 0 to 1. The bigger value α, indicates more optimism of 
decision maker. 
2.10.1. Consistency analysis 
As Fuzzy AHP has been defined its crisp value, it is important to check 
whether the comparison matrix is consistence. The crisp value is the formed into a 
comparison matrix similar with conventional AHP. The value of defuzzyfication 
  is developed into crisp value comparison matrix as follows: 
    
          
          
    
          
                                                        
 The crisp consistency of  matrix    is evaluated by AHP methodology 
consistency analysis. “when the conventional comparison matrix    is consistent, 
it means that fuzzy comparison matrix     is also consistent.” (Zheng et al., 2012). 
Consistency analysis is then calculated by implementing equation 7 and 8. 
2.11. Past Researches and Studies 
 Past researches and studies are important as the baseline of this research. 
Several method implementations for multi criteria decision making have been 
continuously developed. As improvement, those methodology, especially AHP 
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has been refined to overcome its limitation. Fuzzy analytic hierarchy process is 
one of the example. In past years, AHP was criticized for its incapability for 
handling vagueness and imprecise in human thought. Based on intrinsic 
characteristic of fuzzy logic which can deal with imprecision, Fuzzy AHP is 
developed as improvement from AHP.  
 First developed by Laarhoven and Pedrycz in 1983, the Fuzzy AHP study 
was performed by implementing triangular fuzzy number, and the computation 
steps are similar in crisp AHP (Kahraman, 2008). Buckley (1985) then formed 
methodology of Fuzzy AHP as improvement from Laarhoven and Pedrycz’s. 
Buckley stated that on Laarhoven and Pedrycz’s Fuzzy AHP consist of two 
problems.” First, the linear equations of obtained equations do not always have a 
unique solution. Second, they insist on obtaining triangular fuzzy numbers for 
their weights” (Kahraman, 2008). 
 In further research, implementation of Fuzzy AHP is developed for more 
complex problems in real industry. For example, assessing risk and safety 
evaluation in coal mine industry in China (Qiaoziu et al., 2016). The summary 
implementation of Fuzzy AHP is described in the table 2.2. Even though the 
implementation from those research has been extensively use Fuzzy AHP method, 
an integrated with Fuzzy AHP and Delphi technique has not been identified. 
Therefore, particularly in this research integration of Fuzzy AHP and Delphi is 






Table 2.3a. Previous research related to Fuzzy AHP methodology 
No Researcher Methodology Problems Statement Result 
1 Wang, Tien 







Improvement for Fuzzy AHP based 
on fuzzy linguistic preference 
relations. To solve the problems 
regarding the inconsistency in 
decision making process. 
Implementation by selection 
optimum location of new car factory 
1. The fuzzy linguistic preference relations are used to 
derive pairwise comparison matrices. 
2. The study reveals that the proposed method yields the 
same result as that of Kahraman et al. (2004)., 
however, we can reduce the number of pairwise 
comparisons 
3. This methodology resolves the problem of consistency 







Application of Fuzzy AHP study for  
evaluating A safety evaluation 
framework containing three factors 
(work, environment, and workers). 
1. The comprehensive the comprehensive safety index, 
work safety index, environment safety index, human 
safety index, safety grade and early warning grade are 
determined. 
2. Implementation of those safety index is best applied in 










Nonlinear methodology to find the 
precedence of risk factors in coal 
mine in China. Implementation of 
logarithmic fuzzy preference 
programming to estimate and rank 
risk factors which involves 
managerial, environmental, 
operational and individual criteria. 
the proposed evaluation system (logarithmic fuzzy 
preference programming) is found out to be more 
convenient, precise and complete during the evaluation 
process, compared to traditional AHP and FAHP based 
on EA method. From this research, its defined that human 
factor has the greatest impact among four criteria. 
4 Multazam, 
Teuku et.al,  
Fuzzy AHP Selection of optimum location for 
Wind Farm power generator 
Based on the calculation, it is found that the alternative 
location of Sukomoro has the highest weight that is, 
0.2518, while the location of Nganjuk, Pace Rejoso and 
Lengkong are on the order of two, three, four and fifth 









This chapter describes the research design including data collection 
process and steps taken to analyze data. The methodology is largely developed 
based upon the Fuzzy AHP technique. 
3.1.   Research Framework and Design 
As stated in the research objectives, formulated problems involved in the 
thesis is selection of gas detector technology. It is necessary to perform such 
research to ensure that gas detector chosen and implemented in oil and gas 
processing area (OGPA) will be suitable. This research is carried out to evaluate 
and quantify specific value as baseline for OGPA’s management to implement gas 
detector technology. The criteria analyzed cover several aspects, such as: 
advantages delivered by the gas detector, Cost required for each gas detector 
technology, and gas detector latent risk based on the technology used. Result of 
this research is expected to deliver detail guidance for OGPA management on 
which technology is best applied. Comparison result of each gas detector 
technology is delivered as quantified value, as it can be directly compared and 
measured.    
The structure of this research is divided into several parts which is 































Fuzzy AHP Analysis 
Start 
Defining background and problems 
identified 
Formulating research and objectives  
Abstraction Fuzzy AHP 
























Figure 3.1 Research flowchart. It defines detail steps in developing the thesis 
research. 
3.4. Development of Selection Criteria and Data Collection 
 For a Fuzzy AHP research to be precise, its criteria, sub-criteria, and 
alternatives should be developed based on applicable research methodology. 
Delphi technique has been known for its advantages to gather and conclude 
experts’ judgment for scientific problems. Delphi technique is particularly used in 
this research for constructing sub-criteria of selection of gas detector technology 
and the alternatives attribute. Three aspects criteria of this research has been 
evaluated in Delphi technique: benefit, cost, and risk. 
3.4.1.   Implementation of Delphi Technique for Developing Research Sub-
Criteria and Alternatives Attribute 
 The implementation of Delphi technique in this research was carried out 
during November-December 2017 in the petroleum company operating the 
OGPA. At first, Delphi technique is performed by describing problems which is 
encounter by the OGPA regarding selection of gas detector technology. 
Explanation of recent gas detector technology and working principle are delivered 
and prepared as the option for the panelist. Then, questionnaire is developed based 
on three aspects that is evaluated in selecting gas detector technology. Benefit 
Gas detector 
technology selection  
Finish 




aspect is firstly mentioned to the expert panelist. It is selected 5 sub-criteria that 
best mentioned by the expert panelist. Secondly, cost aspect is mentioned 
covering sub-criteria for Capital expenditure, maintenance cost, training and 
development cost. Four sub-criteria are selected from the cost aspect. Similar 
method is also performed for risk aspect, and 5 sub-criteria are selected 
accordingly. The number of sub-criteria is limited to 4-7, due to consideration of 
bias and consistency. Development of the Delphi technique is described in figure 
3.2. 
Ten expertise participants are selected accordance to their métier and 
working scope. The participants involved in interview and questionnaire are 
selected from their capability in determining sub-criteria for selecting gas detector 
technology. The expert panelist was contacted firstly by email, and the one that 
commit to perform interview was attended by the author. The interview was based 
on several question such as: “In terms of benefit delivered by gas detector, what 
factors can you identified, please mentioned?”, “what is the reason for you to 
choose reliability factor as determining criteria in selecting gas detector?”. Detail 
question is available on the appendix. The discussion in each round was 
performed by the author and panelist solely. It is impossible for each panelist 
know other panelist in name because this Delphi technique is performed 


















Figure 3.2 Delphi technique implementation flowchart 
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Figure 3.3 Years of experience graphic of panelists involved in the 
Delphi technique 
 
Figure 3.4 Working position of expert panelists involving in the 
Delphi technique 
Those experts are mainly working in Field Operation division in petroleum 
company, East Kalimantan. Engineer panelist was most selected because they are 
the true front-liner to perform calculation on safety engineering factors. Some 
managerial positions are also selected such as, head department of production 
2-5 Years, 2 
5-10 Years, 5 
10-20 Years, 2 
> 20 Years, 1 
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support and head of field operation safety and method services. This approach is 
taken because they are the key person for decision making process in the OGPA. 
Delphi technique is carried out in three round analyses. on round one and 
two, the Delphi technique is performed by interviewing the expert panelists. 
Feedback from round one is delivered in round two. By delivering feedback, it is 
expected that panelist would response to a consensus understanding. Round one 
and two are mainly performed to construct the sub-criteria for selecting the gas 
detector technology. Whereas round three is specified to weight on the sub-criteria 
defined and the alternative attribute. 
3.4.2. Weighting Sub-Criteria and Alternatives Attribute Development 
 The development of weighting criteria is performed by delivering 
questionnaire in round three Delphi technique. The data of questioner is gathered 
by providing pair wise comparison of criteria for selecting gas detector 
technology. each of criteria is developed into open-ended question describing how 
important a criterion compared to another criterion. The preference is collected by 
specially designed format as shown in figure 3.5.  
The questionnaire is delivered to the expert panelists, and they could 
response immediately by providing their preference. The result of this 
questionnaire is delivered thoroughly in chapter 4. 
In this chapter, it is also delivered the alternatives attributes judgment by 
the panelist. The alternatives attribute judgment is performed for the qualitative 
criteria (benefit and risk aspects). Whereas the quantitative criteria (costs) 






Figure 3.5. Preference format data collection. This figure demonstrates the 
importance of one criterion to another criterion. 
3.5. Development of Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process 
By evaluating characteristic of each gas detector technology, the 
implementation of fuzzy AHP is to define selection based on benefit, cost and risk 
analysis. All criteria for Benefit, Cost, and Risk is broken down into set of 





















Figure 3.6a. The hierarchy of gas detector technology selection covering 
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Figure 3.6b. The hierarchy of gas detector technology selection covering 
benefit, cost and risk criteria. 
 Figure 3.6. explains the structure of hierarchy process in this research. The 
involving criteria is divided into two aspects, which are,  
 Qualitative: Benefit criteria and risk criteria 
 Quantitative: Cost criteria. 
For all criteria (benefit, cost and risk), associated sub-criteria will be defined as 
the result of Delphi method. Example of sub-criteria for “benefit” is: reliability 
and delivering continuous monitoring. And another example of “Risk” sub-criteria 
involves environment distractive signal. The detail sub-criteria will be explained 
in chapter 4 which elaborates the results of Delphi technique. 
The analysis for all criteria is calculated based fuzzy pairwise comparison 
matrix. A fuzzy judgment matrix A  based on triangular fuzzy number (al, am, au) 
is developed, which one of sub-criteria is more important to another. Expected 
result from the Fuzzy AHP analysis are quantified weighting value of each gas 
detector technology. The rank priority is then developed respectively. The 
working flowchart to construct Fuzzy AHP method is described in figure 3.7. 
 Start 
Risk Criteria (qualitative) Selection 
of Gas Detector 
Risk sub-











































 Figure 3.7. Flowchart to develop 
Fuzzy AHP method in selecting 
gas detector technology 
Building Fuzzy AHP 
Hierarchy  
Input data related to weighting sub-
criteria from Delphi technique 
Consistency 
ratio > 0.1 
Perform defuzzyfication 
and consistency analysis 
Determining fuzzy final value by 
calculating hierarchical layer 
sequencing 





Develop a fuzzy pairwise comparison matrix 
based on triangular fuzzy number (al, am, au) 
which one of sub-criteria important to other 
Calculating fuzzy weight by 
applying geometric mean 
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3.5.1. Development of Hierarchy Construction 
 Development of hierarchy construction begins with determining the 
ultimate goal of the research. The Fuzzy AHP method should have capabilities to 
conclude which gas detector technology best applied in the OGPA. The hierarchy 
level is described as: 
Level-1:  Ultimate goal of the research is placed as the first level of hierarchy. 
Particularly in this research, the ultimate goal is “Selecting the best gas 
detector technology for the oil and gas processing area” 
Level-2:  The second level hierarchy is called sub-criteria level. This level 
explains all sub-criteria gathered from Delphi technique from 
respecting categories: benefit aspect, cost aspect, and risk aspect. On 
each category, it is applied several criteria for evaluation, such as: a. 
benefit aspect (5 sub-criteria), b. cost aspect (4 sub-criteria), and c. risk 
aspect (5 sub-criteria). 
Level-3:  Third level of hierarchy is called alternatives level. This level consists of 
four alternatives represented gas detector technology: a. open-path 
infrared gas detector; b. point-type infrared gas detector; c. ultrasonic 
gas leak detector; d. catalytic gas detector. 
3.6. Sensitivity Analysis 
 Sensitivity analysis is aimed to detect the consistency of the fuzzy AHP 
analysis in this research. Sensitivity analysis is performed by changing the sub-
criteria weight and observes how many changes occurs in the alternative’s weight. 
The change of alternative’s weight will be acceptable if the alternatives rank 
position is still same with initial rank position. The fuzzy AHP is consistent if 





RESULT OF DELPHI TECHNIQUE AND EVALUATION OF FUZZY 
AHP 
The chapter IV defines how the data are collected and evaluated based on 
the methodology chosen in this research. Data are gathered based on the three 
rounds Delphi technique. The first and second are intended to identify the sub-
criteria which are most applicable for selecting gas detector technology. The third 
round elaborates judgment value for the sub-criteria and value of the alternatives 
over the sub-criteria. The data are then evaluated based on fuzzy AHP 
methodology to analyze the judgment precisely.  
4.1. Gas Detector Alternatives Identification 
 Based on literature study, alternatives identification is performed in this 
research. For the time being, the OGPA have several alternatives which can be 
assessed accordingly. Alternatives identification is necessary based on the gas 
detector market availability and the OGPA capability to possess the technology. 
 In this research, four alternatives are available for the OGPA to implement 
gas detector technology. These alternatives are possible to be chosen due to their 
availability, after-market service, and the existence in other Company’s affiliate. 
The alternatives are listed, Catalytic Gas Detector, Point-type Infrared Gas 
Detector, Open-path Infrared Gas Detector, and Ultrasonic Leak Detector. Table 




Table 4.1. Alternatives main characteristic summary in terms of Cost 
No Specification Alternatives 
Catalytic gas detector 
(CGD) 
Point-type infrared gas 
detector (PGD) 
Open-path infrared 
gas detector (OPGD) 





 $844.00  (each) $1,792.00   (each) $10,300.45   $18,336.00   
2 Maintenance cost
3
 $2,484 $1,380 $1,656 $828 
3 Spare-part cost
4









Table 4.2. Alternatives main characteristic summary in terms of Benefit 
No Specification Alternatives 
Catalytic gas detector 
(CGD) 
Point-type infrared gas 
detector (PGD) 
Open-path infrared 
gas detector (OPGD) 
Ultrasonic gas leak 
detector (UGLD) 
BENEFIT 
4 Detection technology  Combustion in chamber Infrared Infrared, line of sight 
Ultrasonic (sound) 
detection 
5 Coverage area <1m (one dimensional) <1m (one dimensional) 
1.5m - 30m  
(two dimensional) 
2m – 20m 
(three dimensional) 
6 Feature/capability 
 Continuous %LEL 
monitoring 
 0-100% LEL range 
 Continuous %LEL 
monitoring 
 Zero oxygen detection 
 Fail to safe 
 Wide range %LEL 
detection (0-200%) 
 
 Continuous %LEL 
monitoring 
 Zero oxygen detection 
 Fail to safe 
 Wide range %LEL 
detection (0-200%) 
 
 Zero oxygen detection 
 Fail to safe 
technology 
 40-100dB range (only 
two types of alarm 
low level-high level) 
7 SIL
5
 (safety integrity level) 
Unspecified (>SIL 1) SIL 2 certified per 
IEC61508 
SIL 2 certified per 
IEC61508 
SIL 2 certified per 
IEC61508 
8 Response time 
50% LEL in 3.8 seconds 
90%LEL in 8.4 seconds  
60%LEL in 10 seconds  
50% LEL in 4.8 seconds 
90%LEL in 7.6 seconds  
60%LEL in 5.1 seconds  
90%LEL in 2 seconds  
 





Table 4.3. Alternatives main characteristic summary in terms of Risk 
No Specification Alternatives 
Catalytic gas detector 
(CGD) 
Point-type infrared gas 
detector (PGD) 
Open-path infrared 
gas detector (OPGD) 





 Very unlikely Very unlikely Unlikely Possible 
11 Environment signal distraction 
 less oxygen (<16%) 
 Temperature 
 High concentration of 
flammable gas 






 High flow of 
hydrocarbon 





The prices are based distributor price on vendor website accessed on 27 November 2017. 
3
 Based on man-hour required for maintenance, maintenance frequency, and duration of maintenance, accumulatively in a year 
4
 Based on assumption that spare-part cost is approximately 10-11% of Capital expenditure.   
5






 Probability of spurious detection is defined as: Very unlikely, Unlikely, Possible, Probable 
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4.2. Development of Sub-Criteria based on Delphi Technique Results 
The gas detector is selected based on three main criteria: benefits, costs, 
and risks. The sub-criteria were then developed for each three criteria. The 
process of sub-criteria development is deemed as the most important stage as it 
determines the final results. As described in previous chapter, the Delphi 
technique was employed to generate the sub-criteria. The Delphi technique 
involves ten experts from various departments (production, maintenance, 
instrumentation and safety), including Maintenance-instrument engineer, Head of 
Production Support Department, Head of Field Operation Safety and Method 
Services, Head of Operating Philosophy and Safety Concept, Safety Method 
Engineer (3 personnel), and Process/ production engineer (3 personnel).  
. The result of Delphi technique at first and second round is described in 
Figure 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3. The detail results of first and second round Delphi 







Figure 4.1.  Delphi Technique result for Benefit criteria. The number of personnel devoted the sub-criteria are showed on the 
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Figure 4.2.  Delphi Technique result for Cost criteria. The number of personnel devoted the sub-criteria are showed on the 
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Figure 4.3.  Delphi Technique result for Risk criteria. The number of personnel devoted the sub-criteria are showed on the 
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4.2.1. Benefit Criteria 
 Benefit criteria is defined as the main ability of gas detector technology 
deliverability. In these criteria, consensus is reached during second round of 
Delphi technique. It is shown that all expert panelists’ answers toward to almost 
unanimous decision. Especially in sub-criteria Reliability and precision and 
Detection coverage area all panelists are agreed to choose these sub-criteria. 
Table 4.4. defines the definition of each sub-criterion. 
Table 4.4. Sub-criteria explanation according to Delphi consensus in round-2 
for benefit criteria. 
No Sub-criteria Explanation 
Criteria 1 Reliability and precision This sub-criterion is defined as the ability of 
gas detector technology to deliver their 
intended function.  As mainly function to 
detect gas concentration gas detector 
technology is considered as reliable when it 
can precisely detect accurate detection.  
Criteria 2 Detection coverage area As mainly linked to the number of gas detector 
needed, the coverage area plays important role 
in defining gas detector’s benefit. As wider the 
coverage the more gas detectors are able to 
protect hazardous area. 
Criteria 3 Delivering continuous 
concentration monitoring 
One of benefit aspects from gas detector 
technology is defined by consensus: the gas 
detector should be able to continuously 
monitor gas concentration in hazardous area. 
The continuous monitor are defined as the 
ability to measure flammable gas concentration 
and to display the measurement into existing 
control panel. 
Criteria 4 Oxygen deficiency 
resistance 
There are several places in the processing area 
where oxygen might in deficiency condition, 
such as: turbine enclosure, exhaust stack, and 
confined space.  
Criteria 5 Response time Response time is defined as processing time 
for a gas detector to detect and deliver output 
command to shut down the processing area. As 
functioned to prevent hydrocarbon release 
escalation which can lead to a fire, quick 
response time is one of indispensable 
parameter for the goodness of gas detector.  
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4.2.2. Cost Criteria 
 Almost in all aspects of project investment analysis, cost criteria should be 
evaluated for the effectiveness of operation. The petroleum company operating the 
OGPA has determined policy of “cost culture” which means compete on cost, 
cash and deliverability. The operation factors delivered should consider costs 
aspects as the most important parameter along with safety and productivity. 
According to the consensus there are four sub-criteria representing the cost 
criteria.  Table 4.5. defines the definition of each cost sub-criterion. 
Table 4.5. Sub-criteria explanation according to Delphi consensus in round-2 
for cost criteria 
No Sub-criteria Explanation 
Criteria 1 Capital expenditure of the 
technology 
The capital expenditure is defined as amount 
of money which is spent by petroleum 
company to invest in the gas detector 
technology. Although high capital expenditure 
are possible to make safer process design, but 
the objectives is to seek the most optimum 
technology in terms of ALARP (as low as 
reasonable and practicable ) 
Criteria 2 Preventive maintenance 
cost 
The preventive maintenance cost is the man-
hour cost required for maintenance work, i.e. 
maintenance frequency and duration of 
maintenance. This cost is calculated based on 
labor man-hour to perform preventive 
maintenance, including calibration of gas 
detector equipment. 
Criteria 3 Breakdown maintenance 
cost 
This sub-criterion is directly linked to the 
capital expenditure. Breakdown maintenance 
cost is the price spent for un-repairable 
damage. It means that the company should 
replace some spare part or whole gas detector 
system. In the consensus, spare-part cost is 
approximately 10-11% of the Capital 
expenditure. 
Criteria 4 Training and development 
cost 
As part of continuous improvement, training 
and development cost should be predefined. 
The training cost includes the investment of 
maintenance technician and operator training 
to master the gas detector technology. 
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4.2.3. Risk Criteria  
Table 4.6. Sub-criteria explanation according to Delphi consensus in round-2 
for risk criteria 
No Sub-criteria Explanation 
Criteria 1 Spurious detection Occasionally, gas detector often detects false 
gas concentration which can lead to process 
shutdown. Unplanned shutdown caused by 
spurious detection shall lead the OGPA to 
deserve loss of production. Often spurious 
detection can also lead to make the operator 
neglect detection signal produced by the gas 
detector. The real case has ever happened 
when one of the gas detector technology 
produced more than 200 times spurious 
detection in 3-month period, and when it detect 
the real gas release, the operator assume that it 
is false detection, and he neglect it. 
Criteria 2 Probability of failure on 
demand 
PFD is a probability of failure during expected 
demand of operation. It is also directly linked 
to the reliability of the gas detector system. As 
certified by IEC, gas detector must deliver a 
probability with SIL-2 or 10-2–10-3 
probability of failure on demand. 
Criteria 3 Sensor poisoning 
(undetectable in fatigue 
condition) 
When a gas detector is often exposed to 
flammable gas concentration, there is a 
possibility that it does not detect real value of 
gas concentration. This phenomenon is called 
sensor poisoning, and when this happens, the 
gas detector must be calibrated again. The gas 
detector capability in handling sensor 
poisoning will ensure correct reading of gas 
concentration. 
Criteria 4 Environment distractive 
signal 
Gas detector technology should have robust 
feature to the environment distraction. The 
ability to disclose environment signal such as, 
noise, fog, and vibration. 
Criteria 5 Immaturity of technology When a gas detector technology is introduced 
to the market, the manufacturer should 
convince their client that the technology is 
mature enough. The maturity of technology 
includes compatibility of gas detector 




As mainly deal with hazardous material, the OGPA is considered as high 
risk industry. By the definition, risk is a condition where there is a possibility for 
an undesirable event (or incident) occurrence. Risk is defined as multiplication 
effect of consequences-severity by probability for an undesirable event. Optimal 
safe condition can be reached by controlling risk to an ALARP level. This means 
that all prevention and mitigation are devoted to reduce the consequences of an 
incident and/or probability of incident occurrence. The implementation of gas 
detector technology is a form incident consequences reduction. 
Based on the consensus in the second round of Delphi Technique, the risk 
sub-criteria involved in the OGPA operation is defined. The detail is described in 
the table 4.6. 
4.3. Delphi Technique Result for Sub-Criteria Weighting 
 The third round of Delphi technique is intended to gather expert panelists’ 
opinion to determine how important a sub-criterion compared to other sub-
criteria. As described in chapter 3.4.2. the pairwise comparison is given to the 
expert panelists on the third round. This Delphi technique is pairwise comparison 
based on questions given to the expert panelists in figure 4.4. The result of the 
questionnaire will be the value fuzzy AHP pairwise comparison. The results are 
given respectively as follows.  
4.3.1. Benefit Sub-Criteria Weighting Result 
The Delphi technique consensus determines weight value of the benefit 
criteria. The judgment for each sub-criterion is then converted to the pairwise 
comparison in accordance to Saaty scale. An example of pairwise comparison 





Figure 4.4. Example of questionnaire given to the panelist is converted into a 
Saaty scale pairwise comparison 
 
Figure 4.4. means “Reliability and precision” is strongly important than 
“Delivering continuous concentration monitoring”. Overall result of the pairwise 
comparison is described in Table 4.5. 
68 
 





































Name FDW BJ SS GW AD RD DS DW SS AM
Question
"Reliability and precision" vs 
"Detection coverage area" 
3 1 1 1 1 3 1 3 3 1
Reliability and precision" vs 
"Deliviring continuous 
concentration monitoring"
3 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 3 3
"Reliability and 
precision" vs "Oxygen 
deficiency resistance"
5 5 5 3 3 5 5 5 5 5
"Reliability and 
precision" vs "Response 
time"
7 9 9 9 9 7 7 9 9 9
"Detection coverage area" vs 
"Delivering continuous 
concentration monitoring"
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 5
"Detection coverage area" vs 
"Oxygen deficiency 
resistance"








"Detection coverage area" vs 
"Response time"
7 7 7 7 7 7 5 7 7 7
"Delivering continuous 
concentration 
monitoring" vs "Oxygen 
deficiency resistance"
1 1 3 3 1 1 3 3 3 3
"Delivering continuous 
concentration 
monitoring" vs "Response 
time"
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
"Oxygen deficiency 
resistance" vs "Response 
time"
3 3 5 5 3 5 5 5 3 3
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This research considers that the most significant number raised by the panelist, are 
the represent number in pairwise comparison for a sub-criterion. It means that 
number of Modus will be used for the comparison value for the Fuzzy AHP. 
Table 4.8. The statistical appearance of weighting pairwise comparison for 
benefit sub-criterion 
Question Mean Median Modus Standard 
deviation 
"Reliability and precision" vs 
"Delivering continuous 
concentration monitoring"  1.8 1 1 1.032796 
Reliability and precision" vs 
"Detection coverage area 3.4 3 3 0.843274 
"Reliability and 
precision" vs "Response time" 4.6 5 5 0.843274 
"Reliability and 
precision" vs "Oxygen deficiency 
resistance" 8.4 9 9 0.966092 
"Delivering continuous 
concentration monitoring" vs 
"Detection coverage area" 3.2 3 3 0.632456 
"Delivering continuous 
concentration 
monitoring" v "Response time"  3 3 3 0 
"Delivering continuous 
concentration 
monitoring" vs "Oxygen 
deficiency" 6.8 7 7 0.632456 
"Detection coverage 
area" vs "Response time" 2.2 3 3 1.032796 
"Detection coverage 
area" vs "Oxygen deficiency 
resistance" 3 3 3 0 
"Response time" vs "Oxygen 
deficiency resistance" 4 4 3 1.054093 
 
4.3.2. Cost Sub-Criteria Weighting Results 
 Similar methodology for the cost criteria is performed as well. The Delphi 
third round result for cost criteria is described on Table 4.9. 
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Name FDW BJ SS GW AD RD DS DW SS AM
Question
"Capital expenditure of the 
technology" vs "Preventive 
maintenance cost" 3 3 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 1
"Capital expenditure of the 
technology" vs "Breakdown 
maintenance cost" 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 5 3
"Capital expenditure of the 
technology" vs "Training and 
development cost" 7 7 7 7 5 5 7 7 7 5
"Preventive maintenance 
cost" vs "Breakdown 
maintenance cost" 1 1 1 1 0.333333333 1 3 3 3 1
"Preventive maintenance 
cost" vs "Training and 
development cost" 3 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 1
"Breakdown maintenance 
cost" vs "Training and 




The statistical result is displayed on table 4.10. represents value for determining 
cost criteria is resulted as follow, 
Table 4.10. The statistical appearance of weighting pairwise comparison for 
cost sub-criterion 
Question Mean Median Modus Standard 
deviation 
"Capital expenditure of the 
technology" vs "Preventive 
maintenance cost" 3 3 3 0.942809 
"Capital expenditure of the 
technology" vs "Breakdown 
maintenance cost" 4.2 5 5 1.032796 
"Capital expenditure of the 
technology" vs "Training and 
development cost" 6.4 7 7 0.966092 
"Preventive maintenance cost" 
vs "Breakdown maintenance 
cost" 1.533333 1 1 1.032796 
"Preventive maintenance cost" 
vs "Training and development 
cost" 2.6 3 3 0.843274 
"Breakdown maintenance cost" 
vs "Training and development 
cost" 1 1 1 0 
 
4.3.3. Risk Sub-Criteria Weighting Results 
Lastly, the third round of Delhi Technique present the value of pairwise 
comparison for the Risk sub-criteria. The result is presented in table 4.11.
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Name FDW BJ SS GW AD RD DS DW SS AM
Question
"Spurious 
detection" vs "Probability of 
failure on demand" 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
 "Spurious 
detection" vs "Sensor 
poisoning (undetectable in 
fatigue condition)" 5 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 3
"Spurious 
detection" vs "Environment 
distractive signal" 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5 9
"Spurious 
detection" vs "Immaturity of 








 "Probability of failure on 
demand" vs "Sensor 
poisoning (undetectable in 
fatigue condition)" 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
 "Probability of failure on 
demand" vs "Environment 
distractive signal" 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 3 3 5
 "Probability of failure on 
demand" vs "Immaturity of 
technology" 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
 "Sensor poisoning 
(undetectable in fatigue 
condition)" vs "Environment 
distractive signal" 3 3 3 3 5 3 1 5 5 3
"Sensor poisoning 
(undetectable in fatigue 
condition)" vs "Immaturity of 
technology" 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
"Environment distractive 
signal" compared to the 
criterion "Immaturity of 
technology" 1 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 1 1
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Table 4.12. The statistical appearance of weighting pairwise comparison for 
risk sub-criterion 
Question Mean Median Modus Standard 
deviation 
"Spurious 
detection" vs "Probability of 
failure on demand" 3 3 3 0 
 "Spurious detection" vs "Sensor 
poisoning (undetectable in 
fatigue condition)"  3.6 4 5 1.646545 
"Spurious 
detection" vs "Environment 
distractive signal" 5.2 5 5 1.75119 
"Spurious 
detection" vs "Immaturity of 
technology" 6.6 7 7 0.843274 
 "Probability of failure on 
demand" vs "Sensor poisoning 
(undetectable in fatigue 
condition)" 1.6 1 1 0.966092 
 "Probability of failure on 
demand" vs "Environment 
distractive signal" 2.8 3 3 1.135292 
 "Probability of failure on 
demand" vs "Immaturity of 
technology" 5 5 5 0 
 "Sensor poisoning (undetectable 
in fatigue 
condition)" vs "Environment 
distractive signal" 3.4 3 3 1.577621 
"Sensor poisoning (undetectable 
in fatigue 
condition)" vs "Immaturity of 
technology"  5 5 5 0 
"Environment distractive 
signal" compared to the 
criterion "Immaturity of 
technology" 1.444444 1 1 0.881917 
 
4.4. Delphi Technique Result for Alternatives Judgment 
In the process of Fuzzy AHP development, a judgment of alternatives is 
performed in terms of the sub-criteria. The judgment is performed to quantify 
comparative value of an alternative in Saaty scale. The sub-criteria are divided 
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into qualitative and quantitative factors. The alternatives judgment is performed to 
evaluate an alternative for qualitative criteria. Whereas the quantitative criteria 
assessment is performed by applying secondary data analysis. 
4.4.1 Alternative Judgment for Qualitative Criteria 
The alternative judgment for qualitative criteria is performed to analysis 
the importance of alternatives over the benefit and risk criteria. To assess the 
alternative, this research gives an evaluative format questionnaire to the expert 
panelists. This questionnaire is based on 5 scale scoring which is then converted 
into a Saaty scale according to conversion table as described in Table 4.13. 
Table 4.13. Conversion scale of 5 scale scoring to the Saaty scale 
Difference score from 
alternative i compare 
to alternative j 
Intensity of 
Importance in Saaty 
Scale 
Definition 
0 1 Equal Importance 
1 3 Moderate importance 
2 5 Strong importance 
3 7 Very strong or demonstrated importance 
4 9 Extreme importance 
 Reciprocals 
of above 
If activity i has one of the above non-zero 
numbers assigned to it when compared with 
activity j, then j has the reciprocal value 
when compared with i 
 An implementation the conversion 5 scale scoring to the Saaty scale is 
given. In terms for Reliability and precision, the panelists give 5 scale scoring as 
stated on table 4.14: 
Table 4.14. Likert scale scoring for Alternatives judgment 
Alternatives Reliability and precision Score 
Catalytic (CGD) 4 
Open-path infrared (OPGD) 3 
Point-type infrared (PGD) 5 
Ultrasonic gas leak detector (UGLD) 2 
As we know from above judgment, if we compare CGD and UGLD we found the 
‘2’ point difference score. Therefore, in pairwise comparison in Saaty scale means 
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that “CGD is strongly importance (Saaty scale 5) in terms of reliability and 
precision over UGLD”. Similarly, we perform the evaluation for other sub-
criteria. 
The overall result of scoring judgment for Benefit criteria is described on 
Table 4.14 and 4.15. The detail result is attached on Appendix C and D. 
Table 4.14. Expert panelist’s judgment for alternatives for Benefit criteria 
Question Mean Median Modus Standard 
deviation 
1. Reliability and Precision 
Catalytic (CGD) 3.5 3.5 4 0.527046 
Open-path infrared (OPGD) 3.7 4 4 0.483046 
Point-type infrared (PGD) 4.7 5 5 0.483046 
Ultrasonic gas leak detector 
(UGLD) 2.4 2.5 3 0.699206 
2. Detection coverage area  
Catalytic (CGD) 1 1 1 0 
Open-path infrared (OPGD) 4 4 4 0 
Point-type infrared (PGD) 1.1 1 1 0.316228 
Ultrasonic gas leak detector 
(UGLD) 5 5 5 0 
3. Delivering continuous concentration monitoring 
Catalytic (CGD) 3.7 4 4 0.483046 
Open-path infrared (OPGD) 3.9 4 4 0.316228 
Point-type infrared (PGD) 4.8 5 5 0.421637 
Ultrasonic gas leak detector 
(UGLD) 1 1 1 0 
4. Oxygen deficiency resistance  
Catalytic (CGD) 1 1 1 0 
Open-path infrared (OPGD) 4.2 4 4 0.421637 
Point-type infrared (PGD) 4.9 5 5 0.316228 
Ultrasonic gas leak detector 
(UGLD) 4.9 5 5 0.316228 
5. Response time 
Catalytic (CGD) 3 3 3 0 
Open-path infrared (OPGD) 4.5 4.5 5 0.527046 
Point-type infrared (PGD) 4.1 4 4 0.316228 
Ultrasonic gas leak detector 






Table 4.15. Expert panelist’s judgment for alternatives for Risk criteria 
Question Mean Median Modus Standard 
deviation 
1. Spurious Detection   
Catalytic (CGD) 2.9 3 3 0.316228 
Open-path infrared (OPGD) 3.9 4 4 0.316228 
Point-type infrared (PGD) 1 1 1 0 
Ultrasonic gas leak detector 
(UGLD) 4.7 5 5 0.483046 
2. Probability of Failure on Demand 
Catalytic (CGD) 2.2 2 2 0.421637 
Open-path infrared (OPGD) 4.1 4 4 0.567646 
Point-type infrared (PGD) 1 1 1 0 
Ultrasonic gas leak detector 
(UGLD) 4.3 4 4 0.483046 
3. Sensor Poisoning 
Catalytic (CGD) 5 5 5 0 
Open-path infrared (OPGD) 1.7 2 2 0.483046 
Point-type infrared (PGD) 1 1 1 0 
Ultrasonic gas leak detector 
(UGLD) 4.1 4 4 0.567646 
4. Environment Distractive Signal 
Catalytic (CGD) 2 2 2 0 
Open-path infrared (OPGD) 3.2 3 3 0.421637 
Point-type infrared (PGD) 1.2 1 1 0.421637 
Ultrasonic gas leak detector 
(UGLD) 4.3 4 4 0.483046 
5. Immaturity of Technology 
Catalytic (CGD) 1 1 1 0 
Open-path infrared (OPGD) 3.8 4 4 0.421637 
Point-type infrared (PGD) 2.3 2 2 0.483046 
Ultrasonic gas leak detector 
(UGLD) 4.9 5 5 0.316228 
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4.4.2 Alternative Judgment for Quantitative Criteria 
The quantitative criteria are defined as a criterion in which definite values 
are already obtained. In this research, quantitative criteria are defined as the cost 
criteria. To perform assessment for cost criteria, the second round of Delphi 
technique determines several cost aspects to acquire the gas detector technology. 
The summary of cost aspects is described on table 4.17. The cost explanation 
scoring is then converted into Saaty scale. Similar with chapter 4.4.1., we perform 
conversion with table 4.16. 
Table 4.16. Conversion of cost table scale to the Saaty scale 
Multiplication amount 
of money spent from 
alternative i compare 
to alternative j 
Intensity of 
Importance in Saaty 
Scale 
Definition 
1 – 1.5x 1 Equal Importance 
1.5 – 2x 3 Moderate importance 
2 – 2.5x 5 Strong importance 
2.5 – 3x 7 Very strong or demonstrated importance 
> 3x 9 Extreme importance 
 Reciprocals 
of above 
If activity i has one of the above non-zero 
numbers assigned to it when compared with 
activity j, then j has the reciprocal value 




Table 4.17. Summary values of the cost criteria 
 
Catalytic gas detector 
(CGD) 
Point-type infrared gas 
detector (PGD) 
Open-path infrared gas 
detector (OPGD) 





Capital expenditure are the prices are based distributor price on vendor website accessed on 27 November 2017. 
6
Based on man-hour required for maintenance, maintenance frequency, and duration of maintenance, accumulatively in a year. 
7
Based on assumption that spare-part cost is approximately 10-11% of Capital expenditure.   
8
Training cost is assumed that the less immaturity of technology, it requires more budget on training. The price is for 1 module/person.  













2 Preventive Maintenance cost
6
 $2,484 $1,380 $1,656 $828 
3 Breakdown Maintenance cost
7
 $560.56 $1,182.72 $1,133.00 $2,016.96 
4 Training and Development cost
8
 $1,650 $1,750 $2,350 $3.500 
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4.5. Developing Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process 
 By evaluating the characteristic of each gas detector technology, the 
implementation of fuzzy AHP is to define selection based on benefit, cost and risk 
criteria analysis. All criteria for Benefit, Cost, and Risk is broken down into set of 
hierarchy structure. 
4.5.1. Benefit Criteria 
 The analysis for benefit category is calculated based fuzzy pairwise 
comparison matrix. A fuzzy judgement matrix A  based on triangular fuzzy 
number (al, am, au) are developed which one of sub-criteria is more important to 
another. Firstly, to evaluate the benefit criteria using Fuzzy AHP, pairwise 
comparison matrix is performed based on Delphi Technique result on chapter 
4.3.1. The pairwise comparison result is defined on Table 4.18. 
















Precision 1 3 5 5 9 
Delivering 
continuous 
concentration 0.3333 1 3 3 7 
Detection area 
coverage 0.2000 0.3333 1 1 3 
Oxygen 
deficiency 
resistance 0.1429 0.3333 1.0000 1 3 
Response time 0.1111 0.2000 0.3333 0.3333 1 
 
The pairwise table 4.18. is then converted into Triangular Fuzzy Number as stated 




Table 4.19. Converted pairwise comparison table into triangular fuzzy number 





















0.2 ; 0.33 ; 
1 
1 ; 1 ; 1 1 ; 3 ; 5 1 ; 3 ; 5 5 ; 7 ; 9 
Detection area 
coverage 
0.143 ; 0.2 ; 
0.33 





0.143 ; 0.2 
0.2 ; 0.33 ; 1 0.333 ; 1 ; 
1 
1 ; 1 ; 1 1 ; 3 ; 5 
Response time 0.111 ; 
0.111 ; 
0.143 
0.143 ; 0.2 ; 
0.333 
0.2 ; 0.333 
; 1 
0.2 ; 0.333 
; 1 
1 ; 1 ; 1 
Afterwards, the calculation of fuzzy weight is performed by applying geometric 
mean as stated in equation (19) and determine weight of fuzzy value by 
normalizing each criterion.  
Table 4.20. The geometric mean value and normalized weight Wi 































To determine consistency of fuzzy comparison matrix, defuzzyfication process is 
performed by applying total integral value, in which α = 0.5 (moderate level of 
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confidence). If the defuzzyfication matrix is compatible, then the fuzzy 
comparison matrix is consistence (Zheng 2012). 
Table 4.21. Defuzzyfication matrix 








0.4667 1.0000 3.0000 3.0000 7.0000 1.9078 0.2543 
Detection 
area coverage 




0.1492 0.4667 0.8333 1.0000 3.0000 0.6825 0.0920 
Response 
time 
0.1190 0.2190 0.4667 0.4667 1.0000 0.3438 0.0468 
 
The consistency analysis is performed by calculating consistency ratio as stated in 
equation (7) and (8). The result  of CR is obtained as                It means 
that the matrix is consistence and applicable for analysis. The weight of each sub-
criterion is represented by the number of Normalized Wi. 
4.5.1.1.   Alternatives Fuzzy AHP Computation for Benefit Criteria 
 The alternatives for each gas detector technology is evaluated based on the 
Benefit criteria. Baseline of the pairwise comparison is stated on table 4.12. Then, 
conversion from 5 scale scoring to the Saaty scale is performed as stated in table 
4.11. The pairwise comparison for alternatives in terms of Benefit criteria is 






1. Reliability and Precision 
Table 4.21. Pairwise comparison alternatives for reliability and precision sub-
criteria 
 
Table 4.22.  Fuzzy pairwise comparison and geometric mean values of 
alternatives for reliability and precision sub-criteria 
Alternatives 
CGD OPGD PGD UGLD 
Wi Normalized 
Wi 




























































Table 4.23.  Defuzzification matrix and CR value indicating consistency of the 
matrix 
 
The result of CR = 0.0522 (<0.1) confirms that the matrix is consistence. 
Therefore, the analysis is applicable. 
CGD OPGD PGD UGLD
CGD 1.0000 1.0000 0.3333 3.0000
OPGD 1.0000 1.0000 0.3333 3.0000
PGD 3.0000 3.0000 1.0000 5.0000
UGLD 0.3333 0.3333 0.2000 1.0000





CGD OPGD PGD UGLD
1.0000 1.5000 0.4667 3.0000
0.6667 1.0000 0.4667 3.0000
2.1429 2.1429 1.0000 5.0000










2.   Detection coverage area 
Table 4.24. Pairwise comparison alternatives for detection coverage area sub-
criteria 
 
Table 4.25.  Fuzzy pairwise comparison and geometric mean values of 
alternatives for detection coverage area sub-criteria 
Alternatives 
CGD OPGD PGD UGLD 
Wi Normalized 
Wi 




























































Table 4.26. Defuzzification matrix and CR value indicating consistency of the 
matrix 
 
The result of CR = 0.0033 (<0.1) confirms that the matrix is consistence. 
Therefore, the analysis is applicable.  
CGD OPGD PGD UGLD
CGD 1.0000 0.1429 1.0000 0.1111
OPGD 7.0000 1.0000 7.0000 0.3333
PGD 1.0000 0.1429 1.0000 0.1111
UGLD 9.0000 3.0000 9.0000 1.0000





CGD OPGD PGD UGLD
1.0000 0.1492 1.5000 0.1190
6.7021 1.0000 7.0000 0.4667
0.6667 0.1429 1.0000 0.1190










3.   Delivering continuous concentration monitoring 
Table 4.27. Pairwise comparison alternatives for delivering continuous 
concentration monitoring 
 
Table 4.28.  Fuzzy pairwise comparison and geometric mean values of 
alternatives for delivering continuous concentration monitoring 
Alternatives 
CGD OPGD PGD UGLD 
Wi Normalized 
Wi 




























































Table 4.29.  Defuzzification matrix and CR value indicating consistency of the 
matrix 
 
The result of CR = 0.0773 (<0.1) confirms that the matrix is consistence. 
Therefore, the analysis is applicable. 
CGD OPGD PGD UGLD
CGD 1.0000 3.0000 0.2000 5.0000
OPGD 0.3333 1.0000 0.2000 3.0000
PGD 5.0000 5.0000 1.0000 9.0000
UGLD 0.2000 0.3333 0.1111 1.0000





CGD OPGD PGD UGLD
1.0000 3.0000 0.2190 5.0000
0.3333 1.0000 0.2190 3.0000
4.5652 4.5652 1.0000 8.5000










4.   Oxygen deficiency resistance 
Table 4.30. Pairwise comparison alternatives for oxygen deficiency resistance 
 
Table 4.31.  Fuzzy pairwise comparison and geometric mean values of 
alternatives for delivering oxygen deficiency resistance 
Alternatives 
CGD OPGD PGD UGLD 
Wi Normalized 
Wi 




























































Table 4.32. Defuzzification matrix and CR value indicating consistency of the 
matrix 
 
The result of CR = 0.0351 (<0.1) confirms that the matrix is consistence. 
Therefore, the analysis is applicable. 
 
CGD OPGD PGD UGLD
CGD 1.0000 0.1429 0.1111 0.1111
OPGD 7.0000 1.0000 0.3333 0.2000
PGD 9.0000 3.0000 1.0000 1.0000
UGLD 9.0000 5.0000 1.0000 1.0000





CGD OPGD PGD UGLD
1.0000 0.1492 0.1190 0.1190
6.7021 1.0000 0.4667 0.2190
8.4000 2.1429 1.0000 1.5000










5.   Response time 
Table 4.33. Pairwise comparison alternatives for response time 
 
Table 4.34.  Fuzzy pairwise comparison and geometric mean values of 
alternatives for response time 
Alternatives 
CGD OPGD PGD UGLD 
Wi Normalized 
Wi 




























































Table 4.35. Defuzzification matrix and CR value indicating consistency of the 
matrix 
 
The result of CR = 0.0212 (<0.1) confirms that the matrix is consistence. 
Therefore, the analysis is applicable. The final value for each alternative in benefit 
criteria is described by applying Fuzzy sequencing layer multiplication.  
CGD OPGD PGD UGLD
CGD 1.0000 0.3333 0.3333 7.0000
OPGD 3.0000 1.0000 1.0000 9.0000
PGD 3.0000 1.0000 1.0000 7.0000






CGD OPGD PGD UGLD
1.0000 0.4667 0.4667 7.0000
2.1429 1.0000 1.5000 8.5000
2.1429 0.6667 1.0000 7.0000










Table 4.36. Fuzzy weight calculation for Benefit alternatives 
Criteria Sub-criteria Alternatives 
Benefit Reliability and precision 
0.5222 ; 0.5096 ; 0.4424 
CGD:   0.2710   0.2401   0.2799 
OPGD:  0.2059   0.2401   0.2127 
PGD:  0.3566   0.3591   0.3459 
UGLD:  0.1666   0.1606   0.1616 
Detection area coverage 
0.2280 ; 0.2546 ; 0.2803 
CGD: 0.0799 0.0609 0.0756 
OPGD: 0.3584 0.3447 0.4192 
PGD: 0.0799 0.0801 0.0859 
UGLD: 0.4818 0.5144 0.4192 
Delivering continuous 
concentration monitoring 
0.1120 ; 0.1004 ; 0.1309 
CGD: 0.2594 0.2905 0.2817 
OPGD: 0.1318 0.1476 0.1732 
PGD: 0.4590 0.4344 0.4294 
UGLD: 0.1498 0.1274 0.1158 
Oxygen deficiency 
resistance 
0.0855 ; 0.0938 ; 0.0949 
CGD: 0.0466 0.0342 0.0325 
OPGD: 0.1487 0.1378 0.1694 
PGD: 0.3184 0.3280 0.4120 
UGLD: 0.4863 0.5000 0.3861 
Response time 
0.0523 ; 0.0417 ; 0.0516 
CGD: 0.2036 0.2017 0.2520 
OPGD: 0.4952 0.4897 0.4959 
PGD: 0.1997 0.2017 0.1549 
UGLD: 0.1015 0.1069 0.0973 
Table 4.37. The final value for each alternative in benefit criteria 
Alternatives Final Fuzzy weight Final Defuzzified 
weight 
 Catalytic gas detector (CGD) 0.1927 0.1702 0.1850 0.1795 
 Open-path gas detector(OPGD) 0.2167 0.2379 0.2503 0.2357 
Point-type infrared gas detector (PGD) 0.2830 0.2778 0.2724 0.2777 
 Ultrasonic gas leak detector (UGLD) 0.2552 0.2725 0.2408 0.2602 
 
4.5.2. Cost Criteria 
The next step is to develop similar Fuzzy AHP technique for the Cost 




















expenditure of the 
technology 1 3 5 7 
Preventive 
maintenance cost 0.3333 1 1 3 
Breakdown 
maintenance cost 0.2000 1.0000 1 1 
Training and 
development cost 0.1429 0.3333 1.0000 1 
Table 4.39.  Converted pairwise comparison table into triangular fuzzy number 















expenditure of the 
technology 
1 ; 1 ; 1 1 ; 3 ; 5 3 ; 5 ; 7 5 ; 7 ; 9 
Preventive 
maintenance cost 
0.2 ; 0.333 ; 
1 
1 ; 1 ; 1 1 ; 1 ; 3 1 ; 3 ; 5 
Breakdown 
maintenance cost 
0.2 ; 0.333 ; 
1 




0.143 ; 0.2 
0.143 ; 0.2 ; 
0.333 
0.333 ; 1 ; 1 1 ; 1 ; 1 
Table 4.40. The geometric mean values and normalized weight Wi 





























Table 4.41. Defuzzyfication matrix 


















0.1492 0.2190 0.8333 1.0000 0.4000 0.0739 
The calculation of consistency ratio obtained is              . By the result, it 
is confirmed that the matrix is consistence and applicable for analysis. 
4.5.2.1.   Alternatives Fuzzy AHP Computation for Cost criteria 
 The alternatives for cost criteria is evaluated based on conversion from 
different amount of money spent by the company for an alternative to another 
alternative. The pairwise comparison matrix and Fuzzy AHP calculation is 
described on table 4.42 – 4.44. 
1.   Capital expenditure of the technology 




CGD OPGD PGD UGLD
CGD 1.0000 0.2000 0.2000 0.1111
OPGD 5.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.3333
PGD 5.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.3333
UGLD 9.0000 3.0000 3.0000 1.0000
1. Capital cost to acquire technology
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Table 4.43.  Fuzzy pairwise comparison and geometric mean values of 
alternatives in terms of Capital expenditure of the technology 
Alternatives 
CGD OPGD PGD UGLD 
Wi Normalized 
Wi 




























































Table 4.44. Defuzzification matrix and CR value indicating consistency of the 
matrix 
 
The result of CR = 0.0720 (<0.1) confirms that the matrix is consistence. 
Therefore, the analysis is applicable. 
2.   Preventive maintenance cost 







CGD OPGD PGD UGLD
1.0000 0.2190 0.2190 0.1190
4.5652 1.0000 1.5000 0.4667
4.5652 0.6667 1.0000 0.4667








CGD OPGD PGD UGLD
CGD 1.0000 3.0000 5.0000 7.0000
OPGD 0.3333 1.0000 3.0000 5.0000
PGD 0.2000 0.3333 1.0000 3.0000




Table 4.46. Fuzzy pairwise comparison and geometric mean values of 
alternatives in terms of preventive maintenance cost 
Alternatives 
CGD OPGD PGD UGLD 
Wi Normalized 
Wi 




























































Table 4.47. Defuzzification matrix and CR value indicating consistency of the 
matrix 
 
The result of CR = 0.0823 (<0.1) confirms that the matrix is consistence. 
Therefore, the analysis is applicable. 
3.   Breakdown maintenance 







CGD OPGD PGD UGLD
1.0000 3.0000 5.0000 7.0000
0.3333 1.0000 3.0000 5.0000
0.2000 0.3333 1.0000 3.0000








CGD OPGD PGD UGLD
CGD 1.0000 0.0189 0.2000 0.1111
OPGD 53.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.3333
PGD 5.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.3333




Table 4.49. Fuzzy pairwise comparison and geometric mean values of 
alternatives in terms of breakdown maintenance cost 
Alternatives 
CGD OPGD PGD UGLD 
Wi Normalized 
Wi 




























































Table 4.50. Defuzzification matrix and CR value indicating consistency of the 
matrix 
 
The result of CR = 0.0294 (<0.1) confirms that the matrix is consistence. 
Therefore, the analysis is applicable. 
4.   Training and development cost 







CGD OPGD PGD UGLD
1.0000 0.4667 0.2190 0.1190
2.1429 1.0000 1.5000 0.4667
4.5652 0.6667 1.0000 0.4667








CGD OPGD PGD UGLD
CGD 1.0000 0.2000 0.3333 0.1111
OPGD 5.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.3333
PGD 3.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.3333
UGLD 9.0000 3.0000 3.0000 1.0000
4. Training and development cost
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Table 4.52. Fuzzy pairwise comparison and geometric mean values of 
alternatives in terms of training and development cost 
Alternatives 
CGD OPGD PGD UGLD 
Wi Normalized 
Wi 




























































Table 4.53. Defuzzification matrix and CR value indicating consistency of the 
matrix 
 
The result of CR = 0.0046 (<0.1) confirms that the matrix is consistence. 





CGD OPGD PGD UGLD
1.0000 0.2190 0.4667 0.1190
4.5652 1.0000 1.5000 0.4667
2.1429 0.6667 1.0000 0.4667










Table 4.54. Fuzzy weight calculation for alternatives in cost criteria 
Criteria Sub-criteria Alternatives 
Benefit Capital expenditure of 
the technology 
0.5764 0.5959 0.5263 
CGD:   0.0582 0.0445 0.0433 
OPGD:  0.2349 0.1958 0.2609 
PGD:  0.1356 0.1723 0.1823 
UGLD:  0.5713 0.5874 0.5135 
Preventive maintenance 
cost 
0.1958 0.1861 0.2458 
CGD: 0.5628 0.5638 0.5082 
OPGD: 0.2517 0.2634 0.2934 
PGD: 0.1176 0.1178 0.1371 
UGLD: 0.0679 0.0550 0.0613 
Breakdown maintenance 
0.1488 0.1414 0.1644 
CGD: 0.0668 0.0515 0.0574 
OPGD: 0.1881 0.1754 0.2417 
PGD: 0.1429 0.1754 0.1836 
UGLD: 0.6022 0.5978 0.5173 
Training and 
development cost 
0.0790 0.0765 0.0635 
CGD: 0.0730 0.0540 0.0586 
OPGD: 0.2706 0.2093 0.2684 
PGD: 0.1562 0.1842 0.1875 
UGLD: 0.5001 0.5525 0.4856 
Table 4.55. The final value for each alternative in cost criteria 
Alternatives Final Fuzzy weight Final Defuzzified 
weight 
 Catalytic gas detector (CGD) 0.1595 0.1429 0.1609 0.1515 
 Open-path gas detector(OPGD) 0.2340 0.2065 0.2662 0.2283 
Point-type infrared gas detector (PGD) 0.1348 0.1635 0.1717 0.1584 
 Ultrasonic gas leak detector (UGLD) 0.4717 0.4871 0.4012 0.4618 
 
4.5.3. Risk Criteria 
Lastly similar approach is applicable for Risk criteria. The development is 
described in Table 4.56 – 4.59.  
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detection 1 3 5 7 9 
Probability of 
failure on 
demand 0.3333 1 3 5 7 
Sensor 
poisoning  0.2000 0.3333 1 3 3 
Environment 
distractive 
signal 0.1429 0.2000 0.3333 1 1 
Immaturity of 
technology 0.1111 0.1429 0.3333 1.0000 1 
 
Table 4.57.  Converted pairwise comparison table into triangular fuzzy number 















Spurious detection 1 ; 1 ; 1  1 ; 3 ; 5 3 ; 5 ; 7 5 ; 7 ; 9 7 ; 9 ; 9 
 
Probability of 
failure on demand 
0.2 ; 0.333 
; 1 
1 ; 1 ; 1 1 ; 3 ; 5 3 ; 5 ; 7 5 ; 7 ; 9 
Sensor poisoning 0.143 ; 0.2 
; 333 




0.143 ; 0.2 
0.111 ; 0.143 ; 
0.2 
0.2 ; 0.333 
; 1 




0.111 ;  
0.143 ; 
0.111 ; 0.143 ; 
0.2 
0.2 ; 0.333 
; 1 
0.333 ; 1 ; 
1 




Table 4.58. The geometric mean values and normalized weight Wi 

































Table 4.59. Defuzzyfication matrix 








0.4667 1.0000 3.0000 5.0000 7.0000 2.1195 0.2712 
Sensor 
poisoning 




0.1492 0.2190 0.4667 1.0000 1.5000 0.4574 0.0590 
Immaturity of 
technology 
0.1190 0.1492 0.4667 0.8333 1.0000 0.3584 0.0469 
The calculation of consistency ratio obtained is              . By the result, it 
is confirmed that the matrix is consistence and applicable for analysis. 
4.5.3.1.   Alternatives Fuzzy AHP Computation for Risk Criteria 
Similar technique is applied for alternatives in terms of risk criteria. As 




1.   Spurious detection 
Table 4.60. Pairwise comparison alternatives in terms of spurious detection 
 
Table 4.61. Fuzzy pairwise comparison and geometric mean values of 
alternatives in terms of spurious detection 
Alternatives 
CGD OPGD PGD UGLD 
Wi Normalized 
Wi 




























































Table 4.62. Defuzzification matrix and CR value indicating consistency of the 
matrix 
 
The result of CR = 0.0045 (<0.1) confirms that the matrix is consistence. 
Therefore, the analysis is applicable.  
CGD OPGD PGD UGLD
CGD 1.0000 0.3333 3.0000 0.2000
OPGD 3.0000 1.0000 5.0000 0.3333
PGD 0.3333 0.2000 1.0000 0.1111






CGD OPGD PGD UGLD
1.0000 0.4667 3.0000 0.2190
2.1429 1.0000 5.0000 0.4667
0.3333 0.2000 1.0000 0.1190










2.   Probability of failure on demand 
Table 4.63. Pairwise comparison alternatives in terms of probability of failure 
on demand 
 
Table 4.64. Fuzzy pairwise comparison and geometric mean values of 
alternatives in terms of probability of failure on demand 
Alternatives 
CGD OPGD PGD UGLD 
Wi Normalized 
Wi 




























































Table 4.65. Defuzzification matrix and CR value indicating consistency of the 
matrix 
 
The result of CR = 0.0130 (<0.1) confirms that the matrix is consistence. 
Therefore, the analysis is applicable. 
CGD OPGD PGD UGLD
CGD 1.0000 0.2000 3.0000 0.2000
OPGD 5.0000 1.0000 7.0000 1.0000
PGD 0.3333 0.1429 1.0000 0.1429
UGLD 5.0000 1.0000 7.0000 1.0000





CGD OPGD PGD UGLD
1.0000 0.2190 3.0000 0.2190
4.5652 1.0000 7.0000 1.5000
0.3333 0.1429 1.0000 0.1492










3.   Sensor poisoning 
Table 4.66. Pairwise comparison alternatives in terms of sensor poisoning 
 
Table 4.67. Fuzzy pairwise comparison and geometric mean values of 
alternatives in terms of probability of sensor poisoning  
Alternatives 
CGD OPGD PGD UGLD 
Wi Normalized 
Wi 




























































Table 4.68. Defuzzification matrix and CR value indicating consistency of the 
matrix 
 
The result of CR = 0.0544 (<0.1) is confirms that the matrix is consistence. 
Therefore, the analysis is applicable. 
 
CGD OPGD PGD UGLD
CGD 1.0000 5.0000 9.0000 3.0000
OPGD 0.2000 1.0000 3.0000 0.3333
PGD 0.1111 0.3333 1.0000 0.1429
UGLD 0.3333 3.0000 7.0000 1.0000





CGD OPGD PGD UGLD
1.0000 5.0000 8.5000 3.0000
0.2000 1.0000 3.0000 0.4667
0.1176 0.3333 1.0000 0.1492










4.   Environment distractive signal 
Table 4.69. Pairwise comparison alternatives in terms of environment 
distractive signal 
 
Table 4.70. Fuzzy pairwise comparison and geometric mean values of 
alternatives in terms of environment distractive signal 
Alternatives 
CGD OPGD PGD UGLD 
Wi Normalized 
Wi 




























































Table 4.71. Defuzzification matrix and CR value indicating consistency of the 
matrix 
 
The result of CR = 0.0130 (<0.1) confirms that the matrix is consistence. 
Therefore, the analysis is applicable. 
CGD OPGD PGD UGLD
CGD 1.0000 0.3333 3.0000 0.2000
OPGD 3.0000 1.0000 5.0000 0.3333
PGD 0.3333 0.2000 1.0000 0.1429
UGLD 5.0000 3.0000 7.0000 1.0000





CGD OPGD PGD UGLD
1.0000 0.4667 3.0000 0.2190
2.1429 1.0000 5.0000 0.4667
0.3333 0.2000 1.0000 0.1492










5.   Immaturity technology 
Table 4.72. Pairwise comparison alternatives in terms of immaturity 
technology 
 
Table 4.73. Fuzzy pairwise comparison and geometric mean values of 
alternatives in terms of immaturity technology 
Alternatives 
CGD OPGD PGD UGLD 
Wi Normalized 
Wi 




























































Table 4.74. Defuzzification matrix and CR value indicating consistency of the 
matrix 
 
The result of CR = 0.0068 (<0.1) confirms that the matrix is consistence. 
Therefore, the analysis is applicable. 
CGD OPGD PGD UGLD
CGD 1.0000 0.1429 0.3333 0.1111
OPGD 7.0000 1.0000 5.0000 0.3333
PGD 3.0000 0.2000 1.0000 0.1429
UGLD 9.0000 3.0000 7.0000 1.0000





CGD OPGD PGD UGLD
1.0000 0.1492 0.4667 0.1190
6.7021 1.0000 5.0000 0.4667
2.1429 0.2000 1.0000 0.1492










Table 4.75. Fuzzy weight calculation for Risk alternatives 
Criteria Sub-criteria Alternatives 
Risk Spurious detection 
0.5250 0.5166 0.4537 
CGD:   0.1336 0.1441 0.1604 
OPGD:  0.2860 0.3223 0.3433 
PGD:  0.1153 0.1095 0.0986 
UGLD:  0.4651 0.4241 0.3977 
Probability of failure on 
demand 
0.2578 0.2672 0.2924 
CGD: 0.0965 0.1122 0.1102 
OPGD: 0.5026 0.4636 0.4732 
PGD: 0.0647 0.0720 0.0571 
UGLD: 0.3361 0.3522 0.3596 
Sensor poisoning 
0.1017 0.1185 0.1414 
CGD: 0.6090 0.6306 0.5682 
OPGD: 0.1170 0.1237 0.1533 
PGD: 0.1098 0.1137 0.1349 
UGLD: 0.1642 0.1320 0.1436 
Environment distractive 
signal 
0.0655 0.0517 0.0671 
CGD: 0.1388 0.1469 0.1590 
OPGD: 0.2971 0.3284 0.3404 
PGD: 0.1198 0.1188 0.1063 
UGLD: 0.4443 0.4059 0.3943 
Immaturity of technology 
0.0500 0.0460 0.0454 
CGD: 0.0515 0.0424 0.0485 
OPGD: 0.3042 0.2903 0.3325 
PGD: 0.0820 0.0850 0.0897 
UGLD: 0.5622 0.5824 0.5294 
 
Table 4.76. The final value for each alternative in risk criteria 
Alternatives Final Fuzzy weight Final Defuzzified 
weight 
 Catalytic gas detector (CGD) 0.1660 0.1867 0.1960 0.1839 
 Open-path gas detector(OPGD) 0.3111 0.3220 0.3386 0.3234 
Point-type infrared gas detector (PGD) 0.0962 0.0954 0.0876 0.0937 
 Ultrasonic gas leak detector (UGLD) 0.3767 0.3498 0.3323 0.3522 
 
The calculation of fuzzy AHP for each sub-criterion and alternatives is 
presented in this chapter. The final calculation is summarized in the figure 4.5. 
which describes the whole value number in the fuzzy analysis. All value in the 
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0.1795 0.2357 0.2777 0.2602 
Figure 4.5a. The summary result of fuzzy AHP calculation involved in this 
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0.1515 0.2283 0.1584 0.4618 
Risks Criteria (qualitative)      
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0.1839 0.3234 0.0937 0.3522 
Red font: 
Defuzzified value 
Figure 4.5b. The summary result of fuzzy AHP calculation involved in this 






RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter discusses the results of the research and describes the 
systematic analysis. After we performed complex computation of Fuzzy AHP in 
chapter IV, it is necessary to explain the result of those computation.  
 5.1. Research Result 
The fuzzy AHP final values are obtained for each level of criteria, sub-
criteria, and alternatives. Specifically, for Risk criteria, language preference is 
necessary to be predefined. In correspondence to the risk criteria, the risk is 
quantified as: 
                                           
                                   
                                                                                     (24) 
Where r is the fuzzy final value for risk criteria.  
As defined in the Chapter 4, all calculation result of fuzzy AHP has been 
obtained. Figure 4.5, defined the summary result of all calculations. The 
defuzzified value for all alternatives in figure 4.5. are then listed in Table 5.1 in 
order to simplified the appearance of calculation.  











 Catalytic gas detector 
(CGD) 
0.1795 0.1515 1.1848 0.1839 
(Tolerable) 
 Open-path gas 
detector(OPGD) 
0.2357 0.2283 1.0324 0.3234 
(Tolerable) 
Point-type infrared gas 
detector (PGD) 
0.2777 0.1584 1.7532 0.0937 
(Acceptable) 
 Ultrasonic gas leak 
detector (UGLD) 




Benefit/Cost ratio is derived based on value of benefit divided by cost values. The 
division is applicable for all alternatives respectively. The language preference of 
risk criteria is applied based on equation 24. The final result of this research 
reveals that point-type infrared gas detector is the most suitable gas detector 
technology implemented in the OGPA.  
As a comparison, we calculate the weight of each alternative by 
conventional AHP method. In general, the results of fuzzy AHP and conventional 
AHP are quite similar. The ranking of sub-criteria and alternatives between fuzzy 
AHP and conventional AHP are identical. Conventional AHP shows that all 
consistency ratio below 0.1. On the other hand, consistency ratio of fuzzy AHP is 
calculated by transforming the fuzzy pairwise comparison matrix to crisp number 
matrix through defuzzification process. It is confirmed that all the defuzzified 
pairwise comparison matrices are consistent. 
 
Figure 5.1. Alternatives final value comparison between fuzzy AHP and 



















 Catalytic gas 
detector (CGD) 
 Open-path gas 
detector(OPGD) 
Point infrared gas 
detector (PGD) 
 Ultrasonic gas leak 
detector (UGLD) 
Alternative in terms of Benefit 




Figure 5.2. Alternatives final value comparison between fuzzy AHP and 
conventional AHP Method for cost criteria. 
 
Figure 5.3. Alternatives final value comparison between fuzzy AHP and 
conventional AHP Method for risk criteria. 
5.2. Sensitivity Analysis 
It is necessary to perform such a sensitivity analysis to evaluate how input 
change could lead to output change. This means that if we perform a change in the 
input by adding or lowering the sub-criteria values, how far the expected output 




















 Catalytic gas 
detector (CGD) 
 Open-path gas 
detector(OPGD) 
Point infrared gas 
detector (PGD) 
 Ultrasonic gas leak 
detector (UGLD) 
Alternative in terms of Cost 
















 Catalytic gas 
detector (CGD) 
 Open-path gas 
detector(OPGD) 
Point infrared gas 
detector (PGD) 
 Ultrasonic gas leak 
detector (UGLD) 
Alternative in terms of Risk 
Fuzzy AHP Conventional AHP 
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changing the rank of importance of benefit, cost, and risk sub-criteria. For 
instance, we change the least important sub-criteria to become the most important 
sub-criteria. This analysis foresees if the alternative output value remains same or 
it may change. The sensitivity analysis foresees if there is a change on the expert 
panelists or the OGPA management’s perspective in regards to sub-criteria 
weight, the alternatives ranking remains same. Descriptive graphics and chart will 
be displayed as the result of the sensitivity analysis. 
5.2.1. Benefit criteria 
Based on calculation in chapter 3, the most significant sub-criterion is 
reliability and precision followed by delivering continuous concentration; whereas 
the least significant sub-criterion is response time followed by oxygen deficiency 
resistance. The sensitivity analysis is performed by lowering 50% weight of 
reliability and precision as well as delivering continuous concentration sub-
criteria. It is also performed an addition of 50% weight to the least significant sub-
criteria, response time and oxygen deficiency resistance. Figure 5.4 describes the 
result of sensitivity analysis. 
Table 5.2. The sub-criteria’s weight change in the benefit criteria. 
Sub-criteria Initial Weight Sensitivity Analysis Weight 
1. Reliability and precision 0.5222; 0.5096; 0.4424 0.2611; 0.2548; 0.2212 
2.Detection area coverage 0.2280; 0.2546; 0.2803 0.1140; 0.1273; 0.1401 
3. Delivering continuous 
concentration monitoring 
0.1120; 0.1004; 0.1309 0.1120; 0.1004; 0.1309 
4. Oxygen deficiency 
resistance 
0.0855; 0.0938; 0.0949 0.1282; 0.1407; 0.1423 





Figure 5.4.  Sensitivity analysis result for benefit sub-criteria. 
It is observed that there is no ranking change of alternatives. The result is 
still consistent, revealing that point infrared gas detector still the most beneficial 
gas detector technology, and catalytic gas detector brings the least beneficial gas 
detector technology. 
5.2.3. Cost Criteria 
The similar method of sensitivity analysis is implemented for Cost criteria. 
The most significant factor in Cost criteria, capital expenditure of the technology 
and preventive maintenance cost are lowered by 50%. Similarly, as the least 
significant sub-criteria, training and development cost and breakdown 
maintenance cost are added by 50% weight. As described in figure 5.5, the result 
of sensitivity analysis for Cost criteria confirms that the ranking of alternatives 





















Point infrared gas 
detector 
Ultrasonic gas leak 
detector 
Benefit Criteria Sensitivity Analysis 
Fuzzy AHP weight after 50% changing on sub-criteria's weight 
Initial Fuzzy AHP weight 
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Table 5.3. The sub-criteria’s weight change in the cost criteria. 
Sub-criteria Initial Weight Sensitivity Analysis Weight 
1. Capital expenditure of 
the technology 
0.5764; 0.5959; 0.5263 0.2882; 0.2979; 0.2631 
2. Preventive maintenance 
cost 
0.1958; 0.1861; 0.2458 0.0979; 0.0931; 0.1229 
3. Breakdown maintenance 
cost 
0.1488; 0.1414; 0.1644 0.2232; 0.2122; 0.2466 
4. Training and 
development cost 
0.0790; 0.0765; 0.0635 0.1185; 0.1148; 0.0952 
 
 
Figure 5.5. Sensitivity analysis result for cost sub-criteria. 
Risk Criteria 
Lastly, the sensitivity analysis is performed for Risk criteria. We perform 
weight reduction to the most significant sub-criteria by 50% and addition for the 
least significant sub-criteria by 50%. Consistent result is also obtained for risk 
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Table 5.4. The sub-criteria’s weight change in the risk criteria. 
Sub-criteria Initial Weight Sensitivity Analysis Weight 
1. Spurious detection 0.5250; 0.5166; 0.4537 0.2625; 0.2583; 0.2269 
2. Probability of failure on 
demand 
0.2578; 0.2672; 0.2924 0.1289; 0.1336; 0.1462 
3. Sensor poisoning 0.1017; 0.1185; 0.1414 0.1017; 0.1185; 0.1414 
4. Environment distractive 
signal 
0.0655; 0.0517; 0.0671 0.0983; 0.0776; 0.1006 
5.  Immaturity of 
technology 
0.0500; 0.0460; 0.0454 0.0750; 0.0690; 0.0682 
 
 
Figure 5.6. Sensitivity analysis result for risk sub-criteria. 
Based on the result of sensitivity analysis, it is confirmed that the alternatives rank 
position does not change in spite of sub-criteria weight change for all criteria. 
Therefore, the evaluation of this research is able to a give consistent guidance to 
select the gas detector technology. 
5.3. Managerial Implication 
 As mentioned in this research, point-type infrared gas detector brings the 
highest value in terms of benefits and risk criteria. It means that point-type 
infrared gas detector is the best option for the OGPA management to implement 
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technology benefit, cost and risk managerial implication for the OGPA. Based on 
the research analysis and evaluation that has been performed in previous chapter, 
we believe that this research has a managerial implication to Petroleum Company 
owned the OGPA as follow: 
1. Petroleum Company obtains clear description of quantitative value for each 
gas detector technology in terms of their capability and applicability in 
OGPA. 
2. Petroleum Company is able to determine the best applicable technology in 
terms of ALARP for selecting the gas detector in the OGPA. The selection 
takes into account benefit, cost and risk analysis for the decision making. 
3. Petroleum Company can use this research as scientific guidance for 
implementing future development of gas detector technology in the OGPA 
or other affiliates and sites. 
5.4. Scientific Implication 
This research involves two analysis of consistency. Firstly, consistency 
ratio method is applied to the defuzzified pairwise comparison matrix. The 
obtained result of consistency ratio is always below 0.1 (CR<0.1). By this terms, 
the fuzzy AHP is consistent and applicable. Secondly, the consistency analysis is 
performed by the sensitivity analysis, a method to detect any change in 
alternatives rank if there is a change in weight of sub-criteria. By changing 50% 
amount of weight in all sub-criteria, there is no alternatives rank position change. 
The sensitivity analysis proves that the fuzzy AHP evaluation in the research is 
consistent irrespectively of the sub-criteria change. In short, fuzzy AHP is reliable 
as the scientific method for gas detector technology selection and evaluation. 
The development of sub-criteria is derived by Delphi technique, a 
scientific method that has been developed and implemented since 1950’s. The 
most beneficial aspects for determining sub-criteria is the consensus obtained in 
the Delphi technique. The integration of Delphi technique and fuzzy AHP in this 
research generates comprehensive studies for determining the most optimum gas 




CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
6.1. Conclusion 
This research has identified key selection criteria for selecting gas decector 
technology using the Delphi Technique. Based on the Delphi technique, 5 sub-
criteria in terms of benefit and risk, as well 4 sub-criteria for cost have been 
obtained with consensus decision in the first and second round. The third round is 
intended to measure the importance of all sub-criteria and alternatives. The result 
of third round is then converted to Saaty’s scale as pairwise comparison based for 
the fuzzy AHP procedure. 
The fuzzy AHP analysis for benefit, cost, and risk analysis reveals that 
point infrared gas detector has the highest score (1.753). This means that point 
infrared technology has efficient value in delivering service to the process safety 
operation. Point infrared gas detector also reveals the best value in risk category 
analysis, which means its technology is capable of delivering reliable safety 
system. The fuzzy AHP evaluation in this research involves two analysis of 
consistency, i.e. consistency ratio and sensitivity analysis. The consistency ratio 
method is applied to the defuzzified pairwise comparison matrix. The obtained 
result of consistency ratio is always below 0.1 (CR<0.1). By this terms, the fuzzy 
AHP is consistent and applicable. On the other hand, sensitivity analysis shows no 
alternatives rank position change when 50% amount of weight in all sub-criteria 
has been changed.  
The methodology involved in the research, integration of Delphi technique 
and fuzzy AHP, provides scientific guidance for gas detector technology 
selection. Concisely, the fuzzy AHP analysis would lead the management to select 
which technology is best applied in OGPA. 
6.2. Recommendation   
Further research can be applicable to determine correlation for each sub-
criterion. As stated by Saaty (2008) that analytic network process is more 
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appropriate to determine decision problems which cannot be structured 
hierarchically because they involve the interaction and dependence of higher-level 
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Appendix B. Detail result of Delphi Technique Round-1 and Round-2 
No. Expert Panelists Delphi Round-1 Result Sub-criteria Delphi Round-2 Result Sub-criteria 
1 Maintenance-instrument engineer Benefit: 
- Reliability and precision 
- Versatile range of gas detection 
- Detection coverage area 
- Oxygen deficiency resistance 
- Life-time of usage 
Costs: 
- Capital expenditure of the technology 
- Breakdown maintenance cost 
- Preventive maintenance cost 
- Training and development cost 
Risks: 
- Spurious detection  
- Environment distractive signal 
- Sensor poisoning (undetectable in fatigue 
condition) 
- Probability of failure on demand 
- Mismatch on existing safety system 
Benefit: 
- Reliability and precision 
- Delivering continuous concentration 
monitoring 
- Detection coverage area 
- Oxygen deficiency resistance 
- Response time 
Costs: 
- Capital expenditure of the technology 
- Breakdown maintenance cost 
- Preventive maintenance cost 
- Training and development cost 
Risks: 
- Spurious detection  
- Environment distractive signal 
- Sensor poisoning (undetectable in 
fatigue condition) 
- Immaturity of technology 
2 Head of Production Support 
Department 
Benefit: 
- Reliability and precision 
- Delivering continuous concentration 
monitoring 
- Detection coverage area 
- Life-time of usage 
Costs: 
Benefit: 
- Reliability and precision 
- Delivering continuous concentration 
monitoring 
- Detection coverage area 
- Oxygen deficiency resistance 
- Response time 
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- Capital expenditure of the technology 
- Breakdown maintenance cost 
- Preventive maintenance cost 
- Training and development cost 
Risks: 
- Spurious detection  
- Environment distractive signal 
- Sensor poisoning (undetectable in fatigue 
condition) 
- Probability of failure on demand 
Costs: 
- Capital expenditure of the technology 
- Breakdown maintenance cost 
- Preventive maintenance cost 
- Training and development cost 
Risks: 
- Spurious detection 
- Environment distractive signal 
- Sensor poisoning (undetectable in 
fatigue condition) 
- Mismatch on existing safety system 
3 Head of Field Operation Safety and 
Method Services 
Benefit: 
- Reliability and precision 
- Fail to safe technology 
- Detection coverage area 
- Wireless (telemetry) monitoring 
Costs: 
- Capital expenditure of the technology 
- Preventive maintenance cost 
- Third party support cost 
Risks: 
- Spurious detection  
- Sensor poisoning (undetectable in fatigue 
condition) 
- Probability of failure on demand 
- Immaturity of technology 
Benefit: 
- Reliability and precision 
- Delivering continuous concentration 
monitoring 
- Detection coverage area 
- Oxygen deficiency resistance 
- Response time 
Costs: 
- Capital expenditure of the technology 
- Preventive maintenance cost 
- Breakdown maintenance cost 
- Capital expenditure of the technology 
Risks: 
- Spurious detection 
- Sensor poisoning (undetectable in 
fatigue condition) 
- Loss of sensitive detection 
- Mismatch on existing safety system 
4 Head of Operating Philosophy and 
Safety Concept 
Benefit: 
- Reliability and precision 
Benefit: 
- Reliability and precision 
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- Delivering continuous concentration 
monitoring 
- Detection coverage area 
- Oxygen deficiency resistance 
Costs: 
- Capital expenditure of the technology 
- Preventive maintenance cost 
- Breakdown maintenance cost 
- Training and development cost 
Risks: 
- Spurious detection  
- Environment distractive signal 
- Sensor poisoning (undetectable in fatigue 
condition) 
- Probability of failure on demand 
- Immaturity of technology 
- Delivering continuous concentration 
monitoring 
- Detection coverage area 
- Oxygen deficiency resistance 
Costs: 
- Capital expenditure of the technology 
- Preventive maintenance cost 
- Breakdown maintenance cost 
- Training and development cost 
Risks: 
- Spurious detection 
- Environment distractive signal 
- Sensor poisoning (undetectable in 
fatigue condition) 
- Immaturity of technology 
5 Safety Method Engineer I Benefit: 
- Versatile range of gas detection 
- Delivering continuous concentration 
monitoring 
- Detection coverage area 
- Oxygen deficiency resistance 
Costs: 
- Capital expenditure of the technology 
- Preventive maintenance cost 
- Breakdown maintenance cost 
- Training and development cost 
Risks: 
- Spurious detection  
- Environment distractive signal 
Benefit: 
- Reliability and precision 
- Delivering continuous concentration 
monitoring 
- Detection coverage area 
- Oxygen deficiency resistance 
Costs: 
- Capital expenditure of the technology 
- Breakdown maintenance cost 
- Preventive maintenance cost 
- Training and development cost 
Risks: 
- Spurious detection 
- Environment distractive signal 
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- Sensor poisoning (undetectable in fatigue 
condition) 
- Probability of failure on demand 
- Immaturity of technology 
- Sensor poisoning (undetectable in 
fatigue condition) 
- Immaturity of technology 
6 Safety Method Engineer II Benefit: 
- Reliability and precision 
- Delivering continuous concentration 
monitoring 
- Detection coverage area 
- Multiple features and capability 
Costs: 
- Capital expenditure of the technology 
- Preventive maintenance cost 
- Third party support cost 
Risks: 
- Spurious detection  
- Environment distractive signal 
- Sensor poisoning (undetectable in fatigue 
condition) 
- Immaturity of technology 
- Mismatch on existing safety system 
Benefit: 
- Reliability and precision 
- Delivering continuous concentration 
monitoring 
- Detection coverage area 
- Oxygen deficiency resistance 
Costs: 
- Capital expenditure of the technology 
- Preventive maintenance cost 
- Breakdown maintenance cost 
Risks: 
- Spurious detection 
- Environment distractive signal 
- Sensor poisoning (undetectable in 
fatigue condition) 
- Loss of sensitive detection 
7 Safety Method Engineer III Benefit: 
- Reliability and precision 
- Delivering continuous concentration 
monitoring 
- Fail to safe technology 
- Multiple features and capability 
Costs: 
- Capital expenditure of the technology 
Benefit: 
- Reliability and precision 
- Delivering continuous concentration 
monitoring 
- Detection coverage area 
- Oxygen deficiency resistance 
- Response time 
Costs: 
- Capital expenditure of the technology 
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- Preventive maintenance cost 
- Breakdown maintenance cost 
- Third party support cost 
- Training and development cost 
Risks: 
- Spurious detection  
- Environment distractive signal 
- Probability of failure on demand 
- Un-linear detection 
- Preventive maintenance cost 
- Breakdown maintenance cost 
- Training and development cost 
- Immaturity of technology 
Risks: 
- Spurious detection 
- Environment distractive signal 
- Sensor poisoning (undetectable in 
fatigue condition) 
- Un-linear detection 
8 Process/ production engineer I Benefit: 
- Reliability and precision 
- Detection coverage area 
- Oxygen deficiency resistance 
- Easy to calibrate 
Costs: 
- Capital expenditure of the technology 
- Preventive maintenance cost 
- Breakdown maintenance cost 
- Training and development cost 
Risks: 
- Spurious detection  
- Environment distractive signal 
- Probability of failure on demand 
- Un-linear detection 
Benefit: 
- Reliability and precision 
- Detection coverage area 
- Oxygen deficiency resistance 
- Response time 
Costs: 
- Capital expenditure of the technology 
- Preventive maintenance cost 
- Breakdown maintenance cost 
- Training and development cost 
Risks: 
- Spurious detection 
- Environment distractive signal 
- Sensor poisoning (undetectable in 
fatigue condition) 
- Immaturity of technology 
- Inhibition failure 
9 Process/ production engineer II Benefit: 
- Reliability and precision 
- Delivering continuous concentration 
Benefit: 
- Reliability and precision 





- Detection coverage area 
- Fail to safe technology 
Costs: 
- Capital expenditure of the technology 
- Preventive maintenance cost 
- Breakdown maintenance cost 
- Training and development cost 
Risks: 
- Spurious detection  
- Environment distractive signal 
- Sensor poisoning (undetectable in fatigue 
condition) 
- Probability of failure on demand 
- Detection coverage area 
- Response time 
Costs: 
- Capital expenditure of the technology 
- Preventive maintenance cost 
- Breakdown maintenance cost 
- Training and development cost 
Risks: 
- Spurious detection 
- Environment distractive signal 
- Sensor poisoning (undetectable in 
fatigue condition) 
- Immaturity of technology 
10 Process/ production engineer III Benefit: 
- Reliability and precision 
- Ability to limit the area of gas release 
- Easy to calibrate 
 
Costs: 
- Capital expenditure of the technology 
- Preventive maintenance cost 
- Breakdown maintenance cost 
- Training and development cost 
Risks: 
- Spurious detection  
- Environment distractive signal 
- Probability of failure on demand 
- Inhibition failure 
Benefit: 
- Reliability and precision 
- Delivering continuous concentration 
monitoring 
- Detection coverage area 
- Response time 
Costs: 
- Capital expenditure of the technology 
- Preventive maintenance cost 
- Breakdown maintenance cost 
- Training and development cost 
Risks: 
- Spurious detection 
- Environment distractive signal 












































Name FDW BJ SS GW AD RD DS DW SS AM
Catalytic (CGD) 4 4 3 4 3 4 3 3 4 3
Open-path infrared (OPGD) 4 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4
Point type infrared (PGD) 5 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 4
Ultrasonic gas leak detector 
(UGLD) 3 3 2 3 1 3 3 2 2 2
Catalytic (CGD) 4 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 3
Open-path infrared (OPGD) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4
Point type infrared (PGD) 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4
Ultrasonic gas leak detector 
(UGLD) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Catalytic (CGD) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Open-path infrared (OPGD) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Point type infrared (PGD) 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1
Ultrasonic gas leak detector 
(UGLD) 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
1. Reliability and Precision
2. Delivering continuous concentration monitoring






Catalytic (CGD) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Open-path infrared (OPGD) 4 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 4 4
Point type infrared (PGD) 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Ultrasonic gas leak detector 
(UGLD) 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Catalytic (CGD) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Open-path infrared (OPGD) 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 5 4 4
Point type infrared (PGD) 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Ultrasonic gas leak detector 
(UGLD) 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
4. Response time
5. Oxygen deficiency resistance
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Name FDW BJ SS GW AD RD DS DW SS AM
Catalytic (CGD) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Open-path infrared (OPGD) 3 2 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 4
Point type infrared (PGD) 5 4 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 2
Ultrasonic gas leak detector 
(UGLD) 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2
Catalytic (CGD) 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Open-path infrared (OPGD) 2 3 2 3 3 3 2 3 3 3
Point type infrared (PGD) 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4
Ultrasonic gas leak detector 
(UGLD) 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2
Catalytic (CGD) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Open-path infrared (OPGD) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Point type infrared (PGD) 5 5 5 4 4 4 5 4 4 4
Ultrasonic gas leak detector 
(UGLD) 5 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 4
1. Spurious detection
2. Environment distractive signal




Catalytic (CGD) 4 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Open-path infrared (OPGD) 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3
Point type infrared (PGD) 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Ultrasonic gas leak detector 
(UGLD) 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
Catalytic (CGD) 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Open-path infrared (OPGD) 3 3 3 3 4 3 2 2 2 2
Point type infrared (PGD) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4
Ultrasonic gas leak detector 
(UGLD) 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1
5. Immaturity of technology
